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ABSTRACT
Impact of Antenna Mutual Coupling, Propagation, and Nonreciprocity on
Propagation-Based Key Establishment
Attiya Mahmood
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Propagation-based key establishment is a physical layer method for generating encryption keys based on two radios observing a reciprocal propagation channel. This work
explores the impact of mutual coupling when communicating nodes are equipped with multiple antennas, multipath richness in the propagation environment, and practical limitations
caused by the nonreciprocal nature of RF circuits on key establishment.
First, network theory is used to formulate a model of a realistic communication system which incorporates transmit sources and receive loads, impedance matching networks,
low-noise amplifiers (LNAs), mutually coupled antenna arrays, and a passive eavesdropper. Afterwards, a detailed analysis is performed to quantify the impact of coupling, type
of impedance matching network, and proximity of a multi-antenna eavesdropper on key
rate metrics. Next, the degradation on key establishment caused by the radiocircuitry
non-reciprocal contributions to the propagation channel is analyzed. A calibration technique based on total least square algorithm is used to overcome the non-reciprocity. Results
demonstrate that the method is highly effective in removing the impact of non-reciprocal
circuit contributions over a range of operational parameters.
Lastly, for key establishment, the propagation conditions can cause the available
key rate to be significantly different from the secure key rate which takes into account
the presence of a passive eavesdropper. To study this in detail, a realistic multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) propagation environment is modeled for two communicating radios
and an eavesdropper. Afterwards different propagation conditions are assumed and results
demonstrate that secure key rate converges to available key rate when K-factor is small and
the eavesdropper is not located very close (< 2.5λ) to one of the nodes.

Keywords: Physical layer security, Mutual Coupling, Calibration, Spatial correlation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid increase in the use of wireless devices has brought the importance of data
security to the forefront. In particular, because wireless transmissions can be monitored
by an eavesdropper, secure communications must use key-based data encryption [1]. While
establishing a key to achieve perfect secrecy is difficult, practical key establishment techniques
such as the Diffie-Hellman exchange [2, 3] are considered computationally secure because of
the intensive computational burden required by an eavesdropper for key extraction. However,
the emergence of sophisticated and efficient computational algorithms and architectures may
increase the vulnerability of traditional cryptographic algorithms [4].
Fortunately, the physics of electromagnetic propagation offers a potential solution to
vulnerabilities of existing key establishment techniques. Specifically, because electromagnetic
propagation is reciprocal, two nodes that use bidirectional training transmissions to estimate
the transfer functions between their antennas will theoretically observe the same results [5–
16], and therefore each node can use its own observations to establish a common key. An
eavesdropper listening to the training transmissions will observe a different transfer function,
although spatial correlation between the channels observed by the legitimate nodes and the
eavesdropper can reduce the number of key bits that can be securely generated [17]. If the
channel varies in time, then the key can be updated at regular intervals, reducing the amount
of time a key is used and dramatically improving the security [1].
Early work on propagation-based key establishment has provided a theoretical basis
for the concept [5, 9, 18–21]. Subsequent work has provided practical methods for key generation in radio protocols [12, 22, 23], experimentally explored the achievable performance of
real channels [17], studied the impact of spatial and temporal correlation in multi-antenna
channels [24], and proposed methods for using low-complexity reconfigurable antennas to
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artificially create time-varying channels [25, 26]. While significant work regarding both the
theoretical potential and the practical implementation of physical layer key establishment
has been done, most prior literature ignores the impact of antenna mutual coupling, radio
circuits and realistic propagation modeling. First, antenna mutual coupling, both between
elements within a communication antenna array as well as between elements of two different
arrays, can change the degree of similarity between the channel observed by a legitimate
node and that observed by a proximate eavesdropper. Second, because practical radios use
different circuit paths for transmit and receive, incorporation of the circuits as part of the
channel destroys the reciprocity and jeopardizes the viability of channel-based key establishment. Finally, the ultimate performance of channel-based key establishment depends on
the electromagnetic propagation environment. Therefore, carefully analyzing the impact of
the circuits and propagation conditions on the key establishment performance and devising
methods to remove the impacts of the non-reciprocal contributors to the channel transfer
function are critical to fully understand the potential of the technique.
While the latter issue of exploring the impact of propagation on key establishment
is important, one challenge is efficient methods for determining the full spatial covariance
matrix of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel. The typical analytical approach for channel spatial covariance construction is to integrate the product of the radiation
patterns of the antennas of interest and the power angular spectrum (PAS), which is the
average propagating field power as a function of angle [27]. While most work applies this
technique to the transmitter and receiver separately and then uses a Kronecker product
of the resulting matrices to form the full channel covariance, more recent work overcomes
this limitation by demonstrating direct computation of the covariance without resorting to
the Kronecker product assumption [28]. Extending this work for multi-user MIMO systems
helps us to analyze the security of key generation techniques under different propagation
conditions.
This dissertation explores the impact of antenna mutual coupling, radio circuitry, and
propagation conditions on physical layer key generation, including multi-user propagation
modeling for key rate metric computation. The following details the new contributions of
this work.
2

1.1

New Contributions
• While the impact of antenna mutual coupling on multiple-input multiple-output communication performance has been well documented [29], little work has appeared
demonstrating how antenna coupling impacts the performance of multi-antenna radios
that use reciprocal electromagnetic propagation to establish secret encryption keys.
The work in this dissertation uses network theory to analyze the performance of such
systems. The presentation includes an eavesdropper whose antennas may be very near
and therefore coupled to the antennas of a legitimate node and further demonstrates
the signal and noise model when the systems must remove the impact of non-reciprocal
circuit elements through calibration. Representative results obtained with the model
quantify the impact of coupling and of the type of impedance matching used to connect
the antennas to the radio circuitry on the system key establishment performance.
• Prior studies have assumed that the wireless channel used for key generation is reciprocal. While the physical propagation channel between two nodes is generally reciprocal, the transmit/receive radio circuitry introduces non-reciprocal contributions to
the overall channel. This dissertation analyzes the impact of channel non-reciprocity
on physical layer key generation. A calibration phase based on the total least square
(TLS) algorithm [30] is proposed to overcome the effect of non-reciprocal circuitry.
Results demonstrate that a calibration phase before key generation can ensure that
the effective physical channel between two nodes is reciprocal.
• Despite the advances in covariance modeling, most work focuses on covariance construction for point-to-point channels. However, in multi-user MIMO systems where
nodes may be close enough physically to observe closely-related multipath structure,
it is interesting to be able to easily transform the correlation in the multipath propagation observed at the two nodes to the correlation between the multi-user MIMO
channels. This dissertation extends the approach of [28] to the multi-user case where
there is correlation of the parameters representing a spatially-clustered PAS describing
the average propagation from a single transmitter to two receivers. The technique is
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applied to compute information theoretic bounds on performance for physical layer
secret key establishment [5].
• In systems using the reciprocal propagation channel to generate encryption keys, the
secure key rate quantifying the maximum number of bits that can be generated securely differs from the available key rate that ignores the presence of an eavesdropper.
However, prior studies on this difference have largely ignored the impact of propagation
conditions in the analysis [17]. This work formulates a model for computing the secure
and available key rates for a multi-user scenario involving two legitimate nodes and a
passive eavesdropper. Application of the model to a variety of different propagation
conditions demonstrates that the secure and available key rates differ appreciably when
the K-factor is large or when the separation between the eavesdropper and one of the
legitimate nodes is small [31].
1.2

Organization of the Dissertation
To provide context for the ideas presented in this dissertation, Chapter 2 covers

the background material on physical layer key generation, key rate metrics, and impact of
an eavesdropper. Furthermore, related background work on propagation channel modeling
and system calibration is presented. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of radio circuitry on
the performance of channel-based key establishment. Network theory is used to formulate
a model that incorporates the transmit source and receive load impedances, impedance
matching networks, and mutually-coupled antenna elements for multi-antenna as well as
multi-user radios [29]. The model is used to analyze the key rate metrics by using a realistic
noise model and various matching network conditions.
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of non-reciprocity on key generation and proposes a
calibration phase to overcome the non-reciprocal aspects of the propagation channel. Chapter 5 formulates the computation of the multi-user spatial correlation in a MIMO communication environment. This model is used to explore the quantitative relationship between
the available and secure key rates for different propagation conditions to investigate the
conditions under which the secure key rate is approximately the same as the key rate.
Conclusions and a discussion of future work are given in Chapter 6.
4

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents an overview on traditional cryptography and highlights the
importance of physical layer key generation. The key rate metrics and their computation are
also discussed briefly. Furthermore, some relevant background work on propagation channel
modeling and system calibration is presented.
2.1

Traditional Cryptography
The prevalence of wireless communication has produced an increase in the volume of

sensitive information transmitted over radio channels, motivating efforts to find techniques
for safeguarding transmissions against malicious attacks. Cryptographic algorithms are generally employed to ensure data security, and they can be divided into two broad categories.
Algorithms in the first category are based on information-theoretic security that cannot be
broken even with unlimited computing power and time. The one-time pad [32, 33] is an example of such an algorithm. However, these algorithms are very difficult to implement and
have limited practical use. Algorithms in the second category are based on mathematical
theory and computational hardness. It is theoretically possible to crack these algorithms,
but the computational time and resources required are not realistically available. Commonly used examples include data encryption standard (DES) [34] and the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol [2, 3].
The computationally expensive algorithms can be further divided into symmetric and
asymmetric key cryptography, both of which are discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: Symmetric-key cryptography where Alice and Bob are the two communicating
nodes and Eve is a potential Eavesdropper.

2.1.1

Symmetric-Key Cryptography
In symmetric-key cryptography both communicating nodes use the same secret key.

Figure 2.1 depicts this scenario where Alice and Bob are two communicating nodes and the
message is encrypted and decrypted using a single key. However, that key can change at
regular intervals. An eavesdropper (Eve) present in the environment can try to steal the
key by observing the relationship between the input and output texts, but the probability
of success decreases significantly with an increase in the key size. The Data Encryption
Standard (DES) [34] and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [35] are two popular
algorithms that employ this scheme.
The biggest limitation of this scheme is the key distribution and management. Either
the secure keys have to be distributed in advance among the nodes in the network that may
communicate in the future or a secure third party server is required that will perform key
distribution in real time. Furthermore, the complexity of key management increases with
an increase in the number of nodes in the network. Finally, the keys are pseudo-random in
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Figure 2.2: Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm where Alice and Bob are the two communicating nodes.

nature as compared to truly random, and therefore if the key generation process is hacked
the security of the complete communication system can be vulnerable.
2.1.2

Asymmetric-Key Cryptography
In asymmetric-key cryptography the encryption is performed using a public key that

is known to all nodes in the network. However, for decryption a node requires both the public
as well as the private key, where the private key is local to that specific node. Although
the public and private keys are related to each other, an eavesdropper cannot estimate the
private key based on the public key. Examples of this scheme are the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol, diagrammed in Figure 2.2, and the RSA algorithm [36]. A drawback of
these algorithms is the key length. Generally they require much longer key lengths than do
symmetric key algorithms to ensure the same level of security.
The computational complexity of RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithms is
related to the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, respectively. Although
no efficient algorithms exist to date to crack these algorithms, quantum computing or other
technologies may allow breaking these schemes in the future.
2.2

Physical Layer Key Generation
While most communication security is accomplished at the upper layers of the pro-

tocol stack, there is an increased interest in the use of physical layer techniques to enhance
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communication security. As an example, recent research has suggested that if two radios
use bidirectional, half-duplex training transmissions to estimate the propagation channel
transfer function, then by reciprocity these estimates will differ only due to measurement
errors. These estimates can therefore be used as a random source for establishment of secret
encryption keys [5, 7]. Not only does such a technique simplify key distribution and allow
regular updates of the key, but also the propagation physics provide a source for the keys
that is more random than typical pseudo-random number generators [1]. This technique is
referred to physical layer key generation in this dissertation.
In the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Eve), the security of generated key bits
depends on the correlation between the channels sampled by Eve and those observed by
the communicating nodes. Statistically, the key generation process is considered to be very
secure if Eve is located a few wavelengths away from both nodes. However, if Eve is very
close to one of the communicating nodes, it can have a significant impact on the security of
the generated key bits, which is the focus of this work.
Channel fading statistics can also have a significant impact on the key generation,
where the key rate is maximized if the propagation channel statistics follow a Gaussian
distribution [12]. However for line-of-sight (LOS) or slowly fading channels, randomness in
the wireless environment is limited and security of generated key bits can be compromised.
Techniques exist in which artificial perturbation in the propagation channel can be induced
by using a reconfigurable RF front end or reconfigurable antennas [26]. However, in general for static propagation conditions it may be more advantageous to use channel based
key generation as an added layer of security rather than relying on it as the only security
mechanism.
2.2.1

Key Rate Metrics
Figure 2.3 shows a communication scenario in which Alice and Bob are two com-

municating nodes and Eve is a passive eavesdropper. The reciprocal propagation channels
sampled by Bob and Alice are hx and hy , respectively while Eve estimates hz and hg . Note
that hi can refer to the column wise stacked elements of a multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) channel, a single channel observed at multiple frequencies, or both. Due to estima8

hx

Alice

Bob

hy
hg

hz
Eve

Figure 2.3: System model for secure communication, where Alice and Bob are the legitimate
nodes and Eve is a passive eavesdropper

tion errors, each channel is corrupted by noise and the estimated channels can be expressed
as ĥi = hi + η i , where i ∈ {x, y, z, g} and η i represents estimation error at the designated
node. In order to quantify key generation performance, the metrics available key rate and
secure key rate are used.
Available Key Rate
The available key rate IK (or key rate for short) is the number of key bits available
per observation of the reciprocal channel between Alice and Bob, quantified as the mutual
information between channels ĥx and ĥy . If the statistics of the propagation channel are
Gaussian, IK can be computed as [17]
IK = I(ĥx ; ĥy )
= h(ĥx ) + h(ĥy ) − h(ĥx , ĥy )
= log2 (πe)NA |R̂xx | + log2 (πe)NB |R̂yy | + log2 (πe)NA NB |R̂XY |
= log2

|R̂xx ||R̂yy |
|R̂XY |

,

(2.1)

where h(·) is the entropy, | · | is the determinant, I(·; ·) is the mutual information, R̂ξξ0 =
n
o
E ĥξ ĥ†ξ0 , and E {·} is an expectation. Furthermore, capital covariance subscripts are
notation for
n
o
R̂X1 X2 ...XN = E ĥX1 X2 ...XN ĥ†X1 X2 ...XN ,
9

(2.2)

where ĥX1 X2 ...XN =

h

ĥ†X1

ĥ†X2

...

ĥ†XN

i†

. The covariance matrices presented in (4.33)

can be expressed as
R̂xx = Rxx + σb2 I,

(2.3)

R̂yy = Ryy + σa2 I,


Rxx
Rxx + σb2 I
,
R̂XY = 
2
Rxx
Ryy + σa I

(2.4)
(2.5)

where σa2 and σb2 are the estimation error variances at Alice and Bob, respectively and I is
the identity matrix. If the channels are reciprocal then Rxx = Ryy . Note that the key rate
differs from the more commonly known MIMO channel capacity. Capacity is the mutual
information between the input and output of a communication system, while the key rate
refers to the mutual information between the propagation channels.
Secure Key Rate
If Eve is located close to one of the nodes, then the channels ĥz and ĥg observed by
Eve may be statistically correlated with the channel ĥx and ĥy , respectively. As a result, Eve
has information that may make some of the bits in IK insecure. Therefore the secure key rate
ISK is used to quantify the number of key bits that are secure from the eavesdropper [17],
which is given by
ISK = I(ĥx ; ĥy |ĥz , ĥg )
= h(ĥx |ĥz , ĥg ) + h(ĥy |ĥz , ĥg ) − h(ĥx , ĥy |ĥz , ĥg )
= h(ĥx , ĥz , ĥg ) + h(ĥy , ĥz , ĥg ) − h(ĥz , ĥg ) − h(ĥx , ĥy , ĥz , ĥg )
= log2

|R̂XZG ||R̂YZG |
|R̂ZG ||R̂XYZG |

.

(2.6)

Practically, Eve may be located close to one of the nodes. For example, if Eve is located
close to Bob, then the propagation channel ĥg is almost uncorrelated with ĥy . Hence, ĥg
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can be ignored in the analysis and (4.35) reduces to

ISK = log2

|R̂XZ ||R̂YZ |
|R̂Z ||R̂XYZ |

.

(2.7)

The corresponding covariances can be computed as

R̂XZ

R̂YZ



2
Rxx + σb I
Rxz
,
=
R†xz
Rzz + σe2 I


2
Ryz
Ryy + σa I
,
=
†
2
Ryz
Rzz + σe I

R̂Z = Rzz + σe2 I,


2
R + σb I
Rxy
Rxz

 xx


R̂XYZ =  Ryx
Ryy + σa2 I
Ryz  ,


2
†
†
Rzz + σe I
Ryz
Rxz

(2.8)

(2.9)
(2.10)

(2.11)

where σe2 is the estimation error variance at Eve and {·}† is the conjugate transpose. From
the two key rates, one can also define the number of vulnerable key bits as
IVK = IK − ISK .

(2.12)

Figure 2.4 presents a graphical representation of the key rate metrics, highlighting the fact
that a high correlation between channels sampled by Eve and other communicating nodes
can increase the vulnerable key bits significantly. Note that the analysis presented above
assumes that the propagation channel statistics are Gaussian. For non-Gaussian statistics
the mutual information can be computed numerically as presented in [37].
Key rate metrics depend on several factors including the number of antennas equipped
at Alice, Bob, and Eve, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the multipath richness of the channel,
and the spacing between the elements of the arrays at Alice, Bob, and Eve. In order to
understand the basics of the available and secure key rates, a simple study is performed that
assumes ideal antennas and a path-based model, where the angles of arrival and departure are
uniformly distributed over [0, 2π], and the path gains are assumed to be complex Gaussian
11

IK = ( hx; hy )
hx

ISK = ( hx; hy | hz , h )
g

hy

IVK = IK - ISK

hz , hg

Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of IK , ISK , and IVK .

random variables [38]. Alice, Bob, and Eve are equipped with an N element arrays with
equally spaced antenna elements with inter-element spacing of dA , dB , and dE respectively.
In order to analyze the impact of multipath richness, the number of paths L in the path
based model are varied. All results are averaged over 1000 random covariance matrices. The
SNR is defined as the mean squared single-input single-output (SISO) gain to mean squared
estimation error.
Figure 2.5 plots the available key rate IK versus the number of paths L and antennas
N at Alice and Bob, where SNR=15 dB, inter-element spacing is dB = dA = 0.5λ, and
λ is the free space wavelength. The results demonstrate that IK increases with multipath,
especially for larger arrays. For a rich multipath scenario, the key rate increases as N 2 as the
channel coefficients tend to follow independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) statistics.
Furthermore, IK saturates as the number of paths increases, where large array size needs
more paths (multipath richness) to maximize the available key rate.
Figure 2.6 plots IK as a function of SNR and inter-element spacing between Alice’s or
Bob’s array, where dB = dA , N = 2, L = 10, and no mutual coupling is assumed between the
antenna elements [37]. Results demonstrate that a lower inter-element spacing dB < 0.5λ
can significantly reduce the available key rate, but it saturates for dB > 1.0λ. A higher SNR
helps to achieve a higher IK , with a logarithmic increase in available key rate with increasing
SNR.
Figure 2.7 plots ISK for a single antenna scenario where Eve is assumed to be located
near Bob, and the spacing between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna is varied. Note that an ideal
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Figure 2.5: Available key rate as a function of number of paths (L), where both Bob and
Alice are equipped with N -element arrays, SNR = 15 dB, and dB = dA = 0.5λ.
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Figure 2.6: Available key rate as a function of the separation between Bob and Alice antenna
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Figure 2.7: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna
and number of paths, where Bob’s and Eve’s antenna are parallel to each other, SNR=15 dB,
and N = 1.

case is considered here with no mutual coupling between the two nodes. For a single antenna
scenario the maximum available key rate is 4.05 bits/ch (bits per use of the channel) [38].
Results depict that for a relatively rich multipath scenario most of the generated key bits
are safe when dBE > 0.5λ. Figure 2.8 plots similar results where each node (Bob, Alice, and
Eve) is equipped with N = 2 antennas, and Bob’s and Eve’s array are parallel to each other.
For N = 2 the maximum available key rate is 16.2 bits/ch. It is interesting to note that
while increasing antennas at each node produces more key bits (higher key rate), most of
the generated key bits are vulnerable (not secure) when the separation between Bob’s and
Eve’s array is small or the environment is not multipath rich. In other words, increasing the
array size at each node can potentially leak more information to Eve.
2.3

Propagation Channel Modeling
The effective channel between two nodes includes the impact of both the physical

propagation channel as well as the transmit/recieve radio-frequency (RF) circuitry. To explore this further, assume that Alice and Bob are equipped with multiple antennas that are
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Figure 2.8: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob and Eve antenna
arrays and number of paths, where Bob and Eve antenna arrays are parallel to each other,
dB = dA = dBE , SNR=15 dB, and N = 2.

limited to a single polarization. The scalar radiation pattern for the mth element in the array
of any node is denoted as eξ,m (Ωξ ), where ξ ∈ [A, B, E] to denote Alice, Bob, or Eve respectively. If the impact of transmit/receive circuitry is ignored and a simple multi-path model
is assumed consisting of L paths, where the lth path has angle of departure (θA,l , φA,l ) and
angle of arrival (θB,l , φB,l ) then the propagation channels between the mth receive antenna
at Bob and nth transmit antenna at Alice can be expressed as

HBA,mn =

L
X

eB,m (θB,l , φB,l )αl eA,n (θA,l , φA,l ).,

(2.13)

l=1

where αl is the complex amplitude associated with lth path. Instead of the simple pathbased model, if a more realistic cluster based model [39] is used then the same propagation
channel can be expressed as
HBA,mn =

XZ

eB,m (ΩB )βB,k bB,k (ΩB , ΩA )eA,n (ΩA ) dΩ dΩA ,

k
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(2.14)

where βB,k bB,k (ΩB , ΩA ) represents a stochastic complex gain function describing propagation
of the kth cluster from Alice to Bob, ΩA = (θA , φA ) represents the angle of departure,
ΩB = (θB , φB ) the angle of arrival, bB,` is normalized to have unit energy, and βB,` is a real
scalar that sets the relative peak (in terms of field magnitude) of the kth cluster at Bob.
The covariance matrices required for key rate metrics can be computed numerically
based on channel estimates. A closed form solution for the covariance of individual channels [39] integrates the product of the radiation patterns of the antennas of interest and the
power angular spectrum (PAS), which is the average propagating field power as a function
of angle. As an example, for Bob the covariance of the channels can be computed as

∗
RBB[mn,pq] =E HBA,mn HBA,pq
X Z
=
σβ2 eB,m (ΩB )eA,n (ΩA )Bk (ΩB , ΩA )e∗E,p (ΩB )e∗A,q (ΩA ) dΩB dΩA ,

(2.15)
(2.16)

k

where Bk (ΩB , ΩA ) = E{|bB,k (ΩB , ΩA )|2 } is the PAS for the kth cluster at Bob and σβ2 =
E {βB,k βB,k } is the variance of the kth cluster gain. Different models for the PAS are
considered in prior literature, such as a uniform PAS [40], truncated Gaussian PAS [41],
and truncated Laplacian PAS [42], where the latter is most commonly used in modeling.
This closed-form computation approach has not been developed for the cross-covariance of
channels corresponding to different nodes and therefore is addressed in Chapter 5 of this
dissertation.
2.4

System Calibration
Figure 3.1 shows a general block diagram of a communication system consisting of

RF transmit/receive chains, coupled antenna arrays, matching networks, and a digital signal
processing (DSP) block. The propagation channel is sampled by the DSP unit after the RF
circuitry at each node. Hence the end-to-end transfer function from Alice to Bob can be
expressed as
0

HBA = CRB HBA CTA + η B ,
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(2.17)
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Figure 2.9: Network model of MIMO system consisting of mutually coupled transmitting
and receiving antennas, matching networks, sources, digital signal processing module, and the
propagation channel.

where CRB and CTA incorporate the impact of receive and transmit circuitry at Bob and
Alice, respectively and η B refers to the estimation error at Bob. The structure of CRB and
CTA depends upon the RF circuitry and transmit/recieve antenna arrays. For a MIMO
communication system, if these matrices are not diagonal then coupling exists between the
sampled propagation channels. A detailed analysis on the impact of RF circuitry on MIMO
channel capacity as well as the approaches that can be used to reduce the impact of coupling
are presented in [29]. A similar study is presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation for key
generation, which includes the impact of both inter and intra-array coupling when Eve is
located close to one of the communicating nodes.
Physical layer key generation requires the forward and backward channel between Bob
and Alice to be reciprocal due to the fact that common randomness between the channels is
0

used for key generation. For HBA to be reciprocal, the matrices must satisfy
CRB HBA CTA = {CRA HAB CTB }T ,

(2.18)

where CTB and CRA incorporate the impact of transmit and receive circuitry at Bob and Alice, respectively and HAB is the propagation channel sampled by Alice. However, practically
there may be non-reciprocal components in the RF circuitry and (2.18) may not be satisfied.
A calibration phase based on the total least squares (TLS) algorithm is presented in [43],
where the goal is to make the propagation channels reciprocal. Chapter 4 investigates the
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impact of non-reciprocity on key generation and employs the TLS algorithm to overcome
the impact of non-reciprocal channels.

18

Chapter 3
Impact of Array Mutual Coupling on Multi-Antenna PropagationBased Key Establishment
The impact of antenna mutual coupling and impedance matching on the throughput
of MIMO systems has been carefully analyzed in prior work [29, 44–49]. However, no work
has yet appeared discussing the impact of coupling on key establishment performance using antenna arrays. While this analysis can be performed through modification of existing
network analysis approaches, the nature of key establishment creates at least two unique
complications that have not been considered previously. First, in fixed unmanned installations, an eavesdropper could place her antennas very close to those of one of the nodes to
maximize the information she learns regarding the established key, suggesting the need to
model the coupling between the antennas of an eavesdropper and those of a legitimate node.
Second, the fact that reciprocal channel estimates are required for key establishment means
that the signal models used must accommodate the calibration that will be performed to
remove the non-reciprocal contributions to the channel created by the radio circuitry [30].
In this chapter, a perfect calibration is used which assumes that the non-reciprocal part of
channel transfer function is already known. In the following chapter, a more generic calibration based solution is proposed to remove non-reciprocities in the end-to-end communication
channel.
This chapter addresses these two unique complications by extending network theory
analysis of MIMO radios with mutually coupled antennas [29] to the case of reciprocal
channel-based key establishment. The development not only demonstrates how to apply the
analysis to obtain the channel correlations required for computation of key establishment
performance but also adds the complexity of an eavesdropper whose antennas may be coupled
to those of one of the legitimate nodes. Furthermore, the presentation formulates the signal
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Figure 3.1: Network model of a MIMO communication system with legitimate nodes Alice
and Bob and a passive eavesdropper Eve. The elements of each array are mutually coupled,
and further the elements of Bob’s and Eve’s arrays can be cross coupled. The boxed diagram
in the upper left shows two-element arrays for Alice, Bob, and Eve along with the respective
element spacings dA , dB , and dE and the distance dBE between Bob and Eve.

and noise models when the impact of non-reciprocal portions of the channel are removed
by using an ideal calibration method. Application of the theory to a representative MIMO
communication system using half-wave dipoles demonstrates the impact of coupling and of
sub-optimal but practical impedance matching on performance.
3.1

System Model and Analysis
Figure 3.1 presents the communication scenario considered in this analysis where

Alice transmits from NA antennas to Bob who receives the signal with NB antennas. Eve is
a passive eavesdropper that observes the communication between Alice and Bob using NE
antennas. Signals in the network model are represented as forward and reverse traveling
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waves denoted as aξ and bξ , respectively, where ξ takes on different designations as seen
in Figure 3.1. The network components are represented by their scattering parameter (Sparameter) matrices referenced to a system impedance of Z0 . All antenna arrays are mutually
coupled, and matching networks are provided to either maximize the power transfer to/from
the arrays or to minimize the noise figure of the low-noise amplifiers (LNAs). Circuit elements
such as the matching networks are in general expressed as block matrices of the form

S=

S11 S12
S21 S22


.

(3.1)

Key establishment requires Alice and Bob to each estimate the end-to-end channel
transfer function for transmission in each direction and then to calibrate to remove the
impact of non-reciprocal contributors to the channel so that each possesses the same transfer
function [43]. For example, when Bob transmits to Alice, Bob will replace the LNAs and loads
with transmitting circuitry. Bob’s matching network therefore is divided into two sections:
one designed to maximize power transfer between the antennas and independent loads of
impedance Z0 , and another designed to minimize the LNA noise figure. If the transfer
S-parameter matrix for the portion of the circuit in the dotted rectangle in Figure 3.1 is
computed, then the effective channel is reciprocal as desired. A limited portion of Bob’s
receiver circuit is used for the signal analysis, but it is important to recognize that the
LNAs are important noise sources in the system. Therefore, the entire receiver model is
used to determine the noise generated by the LNAs referred to the boundary between Bob’s
matching networks.
Finally, it is assumed that Bob and Eve are far from Alice but are close enough
together that their antennas may experience cross-array mutual coupling. Therefore, Eve’s
circuit can impact the effective channels from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice. It is assumed
that Eve knows that Alice and Bob use circuit calibration and therefore uses an identical
calibration to ensure that her estimate of the channel from Alice to herself is as close as
possible to the channel estimated by Bob.
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3.1.1

Transmitter
Using the fact that bA = SAA aA , the incoming wave at the input of Alice’s transmit

antenna terminals is
aA = SA,21 a1A + SA,22 bA
= (I − SA,22 SAA )−1 SA,21 a1A ,

(3.2)

where I is the identity matrix, SAA is the S-parameter matrix of Alice’s antenna array, and
SA,ij is the block matrix which refers to the maximum power matching network at Alice that
relates the incoming waves at port j to the outgoing waves at port i.
3.1.2

Signal Received by Bob
Because the antennas of Bob and Eve can be coupled, SBE is defined as the S-

parameters relating the output waves on Bob’s array to the input waves on Eve’s array
T
and SEB = ST
BE , where {·} is the transpose, for coupling in the other direction. Using the

notation of Figure 3.1,
aB = bSB + SBB bB + SBE bE

(3.3)

aE = bSE + SEB bB + SEE bE ,

(3.4)

where bSB and bSE are the waves generated by Bob’s and Eve’s antennas respectively when
they are terminated in loads of resistance Z0 . The vector v0B = 2Z0 HBA iA represents the
open-circuit voltages on Bob’s antennas, where iA is the vector of currents driving Alice’s
antennas, HBA is a transfer matrix whose entries depend on the propagation and the antenna
radiation patterns, and the factor 2Z0 keeps HBA dimensionless and offers later convenience.
Similarly, v0E = 2Z0 HEA iA is the vector of open-circuit voltages on Eve’s antennas.
To determine bSB , Bob’s receiving antennas are terminated in open circuits, leading
1/2

to bB = aB so that v0B = 2Z0 aB . This leads to
1/2

1/2

2Z0 HBA iA = 2Z0 aB ⇒ aB = Z0 HBA iA ,
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(3.5)

1/2

with a similar result for Eve of aE = Z0 HEA iA . Using this open-circuit result in (3.3) and
−1/2

(3.4) along with the fact that iA = Z0

(I − SAA )aA gives

bSB = [(I − SBB )HBA − SBE HEA ] (I − SAA ) aA
{z
}
|

(3.6)

bSE = [(I − SEE )HEA − SEB HBA ] (I − SAA ) aA .
{z
}
|

(3.7)

FB

FE

Therefore, (3.3) and (3.4) for arbitrary antenna loading become
aB = FB aA + SBB bB + SBE bE

(3.8)

aE = FE aA + SEB bB + SEE bE .

(3.9)

For simplicity, the two matching networks at Eve can be combined into a composite Sparameter matrix designated as SE . Using a2E = SFE,11 b2E , the expression for b2E can be
derived as
b2E = SE,21 aE + SE,22 a2E
= (I − SE,22 SFE,11 )−1 SE,21 aE .

(3.10)

where SE,ij and SFE,ij are the S-parameters for the maximum power and minimum noise
figure matching networks respectively at Eve that relate the vector of waves exiting ports i
to the vector of waves incident on ports j. The relationship between aE and a0E is used to
compute the composite SE,21 given by
a0E = SFE,21 b2E = SFE,21 (I − SE,22 SFE,11 )−1 SE,21 aE = SE,21 aE .

(3.11)

The composite SE,11 can be computed as
bE = SE,11 aE + SE,12 a2E
= [SE,11 + SE,12 SFE,11 (I − SE,22 SFE,11 )−1 SE,21 ]aE = SE,11 aE .
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(3.12)

Similarly the expression for SE,12 and SE,22 can be derived. The final expressions for the
blocks of SE are
SE,11 = SE,11 + SE,12 SFE,11 (I − SE,22 SFE,11 )−1 SE,21

(3.13)

SE,21 = SFE,21 (I − SE,22 SFE,11 )−1 SE,21

(3.14)

SE,12 = SE,12 (I − SFE,11 SE,22 )−1 SFE,12

(3.15)

SE,22 = SFE,22 + SFE,21 SE,22 (I − SFE,11 SE,22 )−1 SFE,12 .

(3.16)

It is assumed that the reflection coefficient observed at the input of each LNA is
zero for both Bob and Eve, since an amplifier input mismatch will not change the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) provided that the LNA noise model refers the noise contributions to the
amplifier input. A well-established model is used that divides the noise at the input of each
LNA into forward and reverse traveling waves, which at Eve are aηE and bηE , respectively.
Since Eve’s amplifier inputs are matched to Z0 , b0E will only have a noise contribution, or
b0E = bηE . Using network analysis on Eve’s circuit combined with (3.9) yields
bE = SE,11 aE + SE,12 b0E
= SE,11 [FE aA + SEB bB + SEE bE ] + SE,12 b0E


= (I − SE,11 SEE )−1 SE,11 (FE aA + SEB bB ) + SE,12 bηE .

(3.17)

Placing this result in (3.8) and solving for aB results in


aB = FB aA + SBB bB + SBE (I − SE,11 SEE )−1 SE,11 (FE aA + SEB bB ) + SE,12 bηE
= SBA aA + ΓBE bB + ΘE SE,12 bηE
ΘE = SBE (I − SE,11 SEE )−1

(3.18)
(3.19)

SBA = FB + ΘE SE,11 FE

(3.20)

ΓBE = SBB + ΘE SE,11 SEB .

(3.21)

e 2B (which excludes the noise from
To ensure channel reciprocity, the traveling wave b
Bob’s LNAs) is constructed when Bob’s first matching network is terminated in loads of
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Figure 3.2: Simplified network model highlighting the reciprocal channel TBA , when Alice
and Bob acts as transmit and receive nodes, respectively.

impedance Z0 . To do that, (3.18) is first updated using bB = SB,11 aB as
aB = SBA aA + ΓBE SB,11 aB + ΘE SE,12 bηE


= (I − ΓBE SB,11 )−1 SBA aA + ΘE SE,12 bηE

(3.22)

Straightforward network analysis based on (3.22) and (3.2) yields
e 2B = SB,21 aB = TBA a1A + ΥB bηE
b

(3.23)

TBA = GB SBA (I − SA,22 SAA )−1 SA,21

(3.24)

GB = SB,21 (I − ΓBE SB,11 )−1

(3.25)

ΥB = GB SBE (I − SE,11 SEE )−1 SE,12 ,

(3.26)

where TBA is the reciprocal channel transfer function as highlighted in Figure 3.2.
3.1.3

Bob’s Amplifier Noise
In practice Bob will estimate the channel after the LNAs and then calibrate to remove

the effect of the LNAs and the second matching network, meaning that the estimate of TBA
will be corrupted by Bob’s LNA noise. Therefore the objective here is to determine the
e 2B . Based the proposed model where the input
equivalent noise that should be added to b
reflection coefficient to each LNA is zero, the expression for b2B with a2B = SFB,11 b2B can
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be derived as
b2B = TBA a1A + ΓB a2B = TBA a1A + ΓB SFB,11 b2B
= (I − ΓB SFB,11 )−1 TBA a1A .

(3.27)

The noise free relationship between a0B and a1A can then be written as
a0B = SFB,21 b2B
= SFB,21 (I − ΓB SFB,11 )−1 TBA a1A .

(3.28)

Since TBA a1A is the signal that goes into matched terminations at the output of Bob’s first
matching network, the calibration is technically performed by multiplying the signal a0B by
(I − ΓB SFB,11 )S−1
FB,21 . The output reflection coefficient ΓB can be computed based on the
relationship between b2B and a2B as
b2B = SB,22 a2B + SB,21 aB ,

(3.29)

where
aB = ΓBE bB = ΓBE SB,11 aB + ΓBE SB,12 a2B
= (I − ΓBE SB,11 )−1 ΓBE SB,12 a2B .

(3.30)

Plugging aB into (3.29) yields
b2B = SB,22 + SB,21 (I − ΓBE SB,11 )−1 ΓBE SB,12 a2B aB .
{z
}
|

(3.31)

ΓB

However, Bob does not know ΓBE and therefore must perform the calibration using the
uncoupled output reflection coefficient
ΓB = SB,22 + SB,21 (I − SBB SB,11 )−1 SBB SB,12 .

26

(3.32)

The calibration matrix is therefore
CB = (I − ΓB SFB,11 )S−1
FB,21 .

(3.33)

Since Bob’s forward traveling noise at the input to the amplifiers is given as Γ0B bηB −aηB [29],
the calibration means that the total signal becomes

3.1.4

b2B = TBA a1A + CB (Γ0B bηB − aηB ) + ΥB bηE

(3.34)

Γ0B = SFB,22 + SFB,21 (I − ΓB SFB,11 )−1 ΓB SFB,12 .

(3.35)

Signal and Noise at Eve
To determine the signal and noise that would be delivered to terminations of resistance

Z0 at the output of Eve’s first matching network, all of the derivations in Sections 3.1.2
and 3.1.3 are used with the simple notational change that all subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’ are
interchanged.
3.1.5

Signal and Noise at Alice
Because Eve is far from Alice, Alice’s received signal due to transmission from Bob

does not include Eve’s noise contribution. Therefore, the channel from Bob to Alice is given
by (3.34) along with the supporting equations after interchanging the subscripts ‘A’ and ‘B’,
setting bηE = 0 (vector of all zeros), and using TAB = TT
BA (reciprocity).
3.1.6

Matching Network Specification
The procedure for constructing the S-parameters of a matching network to either

maximize power transfer between coupled antennas and loads or to minimize the noise figure
of the LNAs has been well documented in the literature [29]. However, because channel-based
key establishment requires reciprocal channel estimates, the matching networks must be
reciprocal, a constraint not explicitly enforced in prior work. Therefore, a brief summary of
the S-parameter computation procedure for reciprocal matching networks is provided below.
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Lossless reciprocal matching networks have an S-parameter matrix that satisfies
S† S = I and S = ST , where {·}† is a conjugate transpose. Based on (3.1), the singular
†
value decomposition (SVD) of the matrix sub-blocks can be written as Sij = Uij Λij Vij
1/2

1/2

where Uij and Vij are the unitary matrices of singular vectors and Λij

is the diagonal

matrix of real singular values. It is relatively straightforward to show that the constraints
lead to the sub-blocks [45]

Smn =



T
 Umm Λ1/2
11 Umm

m=n


 jUmm (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
nn

m 6= n.

(3.36)

where a detailed derivation is presented in Appendix A.
While the system includes several matching networks, Bob’s maximum power transfer
network is used to illustrate the matching procedure. Obviously during design, the reflection
coefficient ΓBE that incorporates coupling to Eve is unknown, and therefore rather than
designing a network to achieve a certain value of ΓB from (3.31), the matching network is
designed to achieve a desired value of ΓB from (3.32). Using (3.36) in (3.32) leads to
1/2

T

ΓB = UB ΛB UB

(3.37)

= SB,22 + SB,21 (I − SBB SB,11 )−1 SBB SB,12
1/2

1/2

1/2 T
−1
= UB,22 ΛB,11 UT
UB,11 (I − SBB UB,11 ΛB,11 UT
B,22 − UB,22 (I − ΛB,11 )
B,11 ) SBB

UB,11 (I − ΛB,11 )1/2 UT
B,22
= UB,22 ΨB UT
B,22

(3.38)

1/2

ΨB = ΛB,11 − (I − ΛB,11 )1/2 ΩB (I − ΛB,11 )1/2
1/2

T
−1
ΩB = UT
B,11 (I − SBB UB,11 ΛB,11 UB,11 ) SBB UB,11 .
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(3.39)
(3.40)

1/2

∗
Choosing UB,22 = UB and UB,11 = U∗BB , where SBB = UBB ΛBB UT
BB is the SVD and {·} is
1/2

the conjugate, and relating (3.37) and (3.38) to solve for ΛB leads to
1/2

ΛB = ΨB
1/2

1/2

−1
1/2
T
= ΛB,11 − (I − ΛB,11 )1/2 UT
B,11 (I − SBB UB,11 ΛB,11 UB,11 ) SBB UB,11 (I − ΛB,11 )
1/2

1/2

1/2

1/2

= ΛB,11 − (I − ΛB,11 )ΛBB (I − ΛBB ΛB,11 )−1 .

(3.41)

1/2

Solving this equation for ΛB,11 yields
1/2

1/2

1/2

1/2

1/2

ΛB,11 = (ΛB + ΛBB )(I + ΛB ΛBB )−1 .

(3.42)

Therefore, the S-parameter blocks of the matching network are specified by the antenna
S-parameters SBB and the desired output reflection coefficient ΓB .
3.2

Performance Evaluation
The performance of secret key establishment based on reciprocal electromagnetic

channels is quantified using two key rate metrics: Available key rate (IK ) which is the number
of key bits available per observation of the reciprocal channel between Alice and Bob and
secure key rate (ISK ) which is used to quantify the number of key bits that are secure from
the eavesdropper. In the following, the notation hx and hz is used to represent the end-toend transfer matrices TBA and TEA respectively stacked columnwise into vectors. Similarly,
hy represents TT
AB stacked columnwise so that the ordering of the coefficients matches that
of hx . The notation ĥξ is used to represent an estimate of the vector hξ , where ξ ∈ [x, y, z].
Note that hy = hx , but in general ĥy 6= ĥx due to channel estimation errors caused by the
noise. IK and ISK can be computed based on channel covariance matrices as
IK = I(ĥx ; ĥy ) = log2

|R̂xx ||R̂yy |

ISK = I(ĥx ; ĥy |ĥz ) = log2

|R̂XY |

,

|R̂XZ ||R̂YZ |
|R̂Z ||R̂XYZ |

(3.43)

.

A computation procedure for these quantities is detailed in Chapter 2.
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(3.44)

3.2.1

Channel Estimation
Equation (3.34) is a model for the signal received by Bob based on transmissions from

Alice, but what is really needed for key establishment is an estimate of the channel TBA .
√
Consider a channel estimation protocol in which Alice transmits the vector a1A,n = pwn
during the nth time slot, where p is the total transmitted power and wn is the nth column
of the NA × NA identity matrix INA . From this transmission, the nth column of TBA can be
estimated based on (3.34) given as
1
T̂BA,n = [BB HBA A + DB HEA A]wn + √ η B,n
p
A = (I − SAA )(I − SA,22 SAA )−1 SA,21

(3.45)
(3.46)

BB = GB [I − SBB − ΘE SE,11 SEB ]

(3.47)

DB = GB [ΘE SE,11 (I − SEE ) − SBE ],

(3.48)

where η B,n is the nth realization of the random noise terms in (3.34). After stacking the
resulting NA vectors into a column vector, the following estimate is created
h

z
}|x
{ 1
ĥx = (AT ⊗ BB ) hBA + (AT ⊗ DB ) hEA + √ η B ,
| {z }
| {z }
p
PBB

(3.49)

PBE

where hBA and hEA are the channels HBA and HEA stacked columnwise and η B is the
NA NB × 1 vector formed by stacking the NA vectors η B,n . The channel ĥz can be formed by
simply by interchanging the subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’ in (3.49) and all supporting equations.
3.2.2

Channel Covariance

The next step is to construct the required covariances for computation of the key
n
o
†
rate metrics. To accomplish this, Kξξ0 = E hξA hξ0 A , where ξ, ξ 0 ∈ [B, E], is defined as the
auto- and cross-covariances of the propagation channels from the transmit to receive antenna
terminals. It is relatively straightforward to show that

Rxx = E hx h†x = (PBB KBB + PBE KEB ) P†BB + (PBB KBE + PBE KEE ) P†BE ,
30

(3.50)

where KEB = K†BE . Note that Ryy = Rxx and the Rzz can be formed simply by interchanging
the subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’ in (3.50) and all supporting equations. Similarly, Rxz = R†zx can
be computed as

Rxz = E hx h†z = (PBB KBB + PBE KEB ) P†EB + (PBB KBE + PBE KEE ) P†EE .
3.2.3

(3.51)

Error Covariance

The LNA noise generated during two different time slots is assumed to be uncorren
o
†
lated, or E η B,n η B,m = 0 for m 6= n. Therefore, the estimated covariance matrix can be
expressed as
1
R̂xx = Rxx + INA ⊗ Rη,BB ,
p

(3.52)

n
o
where Rη,BB = E η B η †B . Based on the analysis in [29], it is simple to show that

Rη,BB = E [CB (Γ0B bηB − aηB ) + ΥB bηE ][CB (Γ0B bηB − aηB ) + ΥB bηE ]†
= κTβE ΥB Υ†B + κCB RN,B C†B ,

(3.53)

where
E

n
n

aηξ a†ηξ

o

= κTαξ I,

o

E bηξ b†ηξ = κTβξ I,
n
o
∗
E aηξ b†ηξ = κTΓξ
I,
∗
RN,B = TαB I − TΓB Γ0B − TΓB
Γ†0B + TβB Γ0B Γ†0B ,

(3.54)
(3.55)

and κ is Boltzmann constant times the bandwidth and ξ ∈ [B, E]. The equivalent noise
temperatures Tαξ , Tβξ and TΓξ for ξ ∈ [A, B, E] define the noise performance of the LNAs
and are discussed in more detail in [29]. The covariance R̂zz has an identical form, with
Rη,EE computed from (3.53) and (3.55) by interchanging the subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’.
A bipolar junction transistor taken from a Hewlett-Packard Application Note [50] is
used as the LNA in this work. The S-parameters and noise parameters of this transistor
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at 4 GHz are SGB,11 = 0.552∠169o , SGB,12 = 0.049∠23o , SGB,21 = 1.681∠26o , SGB,22 =
0.839∠ − 67o , Fmin = 3.5dB, Γopt = 0.475∠166o , and Rn = 3.5 Ω, where SGB refers to
the S-parameters of the transistor. Fmin , Γopt , and Rn represent the minimum noise figure,
optimal source termination for noise figure, and effective noise resistance, respectively. These
parameters are converted to the effective noise temperatures.
Because of mutual coupling, the total noise observed at Bob and Eve is partially
correlated. While the coupled noise is generally weak, for completeness it is recognized that
R̂xz = Rxz + (1/p)INA ⊗ Rη,BE where
n
o
h
i
∗
I] Υ†E .
Rη,BE = E η B η †E = κΥB TβE Γ†0E − TΓE I C†E + κCB [TβB Γ0B − TΓB

(3.56)

Finally, because Alice’s channel vector hy has been ordered to coincide with the
ordering of hx and because Alice does not observe any of Eve’s noise, her covariance is
R̂yy = Rxx + (1/p)Rη,AA ⊗ INB where Rη,AA = κCA RN,A C†A with RN,A obtained from (3.55)
by replacing the subscript ‘B’ with ‘A’. Furthermore, because the noise generated by different
LNAs is uncorrelated, R̂xy = Rxy = Rxx = Ryy .
3.3

Results
The analysis is applied to a scenario where all nodes have half-wave (λ/2, where

λ is the free-space wavelength) wire dipoles. Unless otherwise specified, all results are for
NA = NB = NE = 2. Alice’s dipoles are separated by dA = λ/2, while the element separation
dB and dE is varied for Bob’s and Eve’s arrays, respectively. When evaluating the secure
key rate ISK , unless otherwise specified it is assumed that the arrays at Bob and Eve are
oriented in the same direction but separated by a distance dBE in a direction perpendicular
to the array axes, as shown in the boxed diagram in the upper left of Figure 3.1. The
full S-parameter matrices and open-circuit radiation patterns for the coupled antennas are
evaluated as a function of the element/node spacings using the Numerical Electromagnetic
Code (NEC) [51]. The focus of this analysis is on coupling only at Bob and Eve, and therefore
the antenna at Alice is modelled as a simple array of isolated elements (SAA is diagonal).
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3.3.1

Propagation Channel Covariance
The typical analytical approach for channel spatial covariance construction involves

an integration of the power angular spectrum (PAS) representing the average power in the
propagating field as a function of angle and the radiation patterns of the communicating
antennas. Experimental analysis and electromagnetic modeling have demonstrated that in
many environments, the multipaths are clustered in angle, with the angular variation of the
PAS for each cluster described by a common distribution function (C(φ)) that represents
the functional form of the PAS. There are many functional forms for C(φ) that satisfy
different cluster distributions like the Uniform PAS, Truncated Gaussian PAS, or Truncated
Laplacian PAS. Experimental analysis has shown that clusters in many environments satisfy
a truncated Laplacian distribution given by


1
(φ − φ0 )2
C(φ) = √ exp
× [u(φ − φ0 + ∆φ) − u(φ − φ0 − ∆φ)],
2σ 2
σ 2π

(3.57)

where the cluster is centered at the angle φ0 and has width 2∆φ and where u(·) represents
the step function. Figure 3.3 shows a power image of a representative clustered PAS where
each cluster follows the truncated Laplacian distribution, showing that the multipath energy
is concentrated in a few regions in the transmit angle-receive angle space.
The propagation in this work is modelled by a set of NC clusters in the horizontal
plane, where each cluster is described by a two-dimensional truncated Laplacian distribution function in departure and arrival azimuth angle using the parameters in [28]. The
central departure and arrival angles of each cluster are realized as independent uniformlydistributed random variables, and the gain of each cluster is realized as a unit-variance
Rayleigh-distributed random variable. For a single random cluster realization, the covariances KBB , KBE , and KEE are computed in closed-form based on the clusters and the antenna
radiation patterns [28]. Next, the required end-to-end channel covariances are formulated
followed by the computation of the key rate for that cluster realization. All key rates presented represent averages over a minimum of 400 cluster realizations and unless otherwise
stated are based on NC = 4 clusters.
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Figure 3.3: Representative clustered PAS showing four clusters satisfying a truncated Laplacian distribution.

The current analysis focus on cases where Bob and Eve are separated by less than
two wavelengths, and therefore for operation frequencies above 1 GHz and for typical environments, it is assumed that they observe the same clusters. However, for larger values of
dBE or for scatterers very near to the nodes, accurate calculations require that the cluster
characteristics describing the channels to Bob and Eve differ [52]. It is important to note
that if the clusters observed by Bob and Eve differ, the cross-channel correlation will decrease
and the secure key rate will increase, making the above mentioned assumption a worst-case
scenario.
A reference case is defined in which Bob’s antennas are separated by 10λ. For this
case, we compute the reference channel covariance Rref
xx and the reference estimation error
Rref
η,xx = (1/p)INA ⊗ Rη,BB for each channel cluster realization. The value of κ/p is deterref
mined to ensure that the effective channel SNR Tr(Rref
xx )/Tr(Rη,xx ) achieves a specified value,

and the resulting value of κ/p is used for all subsequent simulations based on that cluster
realization. An identical procedure is used to compute the SNR observed by Eve. Unless
otherwise specified, all nodes experience an SNR of 15 dB.
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3.3.2

Matching Network Objectives
Alice’s matching network is designed to match each of the (uncoupled) antennas to an

impedance of Z0 . Because neither Bob nor Eve will know the cross array coupling SBE , their
designs assume SBE = SEB = 0. The objective of Bob’s maximum power matching network is
to achieve ΓB = 0, but the design can be based on different assumptions. Optimal matching
assumes the full matrix SBB in the design and therefore leads to a matching network that
has coupling between the ports to compensate for the antenna coupling. Diagonal matching
provides uncoupled terminations on the antennas so that each port is matched to its input
impedance [49]. Finally, for no mutual coupling, the antenna mutual coupling is ignored in
simulation and matching network design. For all results, Eve’s maximum power matching
network uses the optimal design.
Because the goal of the maximum power transfer matching networks is to produce
ΓB = ΓE = 0, each minimum noise figure matching network is designed to transform a
source impedance of Z0 I to Γ0B = Γ0E = Γopt I, where Γopt is the reflection coefficient
that minimizes the LNA noise figure. Because of Bob-Eve coupling and possibly imperfect
maximum power transfer matching (e.g. for a diagonal match), ΓB 6= 0 and ΓE 6= 0, and
therefore the desired minimum noise figure may not be achieved. The simulations account
for this realized mismatch.
3.3.3

Available Key Rate
Analyzing the available key rate IK ignores the impact of the eavesdropper Eve. The

top plot in Figure 3.4 shows IK as a function of Bob’s antenna spacing for three different
matching network conditions for Bob’s maximum power matching network. For dB ≤ λ/4,
it is observed that IK for the optimal match remains much higher than it does for the
diagonal match or for no mutual coupling. The prior work on MIMO communication shows
that this counter-intuitive behavior is the result of array supergain solutions which create a
variety of practical problems like high antenna currents, ohmic loss, and narrow operating
bandwidth [53]. They can be eliminated by introducing practical antenna loss [54]. For this
purpose, a loss resistance can be added to the diagonal elements of Bob’s antenna impedance
matrix ZBB before computing the S-parameter matrix SBB , with the loss resistance RL,m
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Figure 3.4: Available key rate as a function of Bob’s antenna element spacing (dB /λ) for
three different matching network conditions when the antenna element efficiency µ is assumed
to be 100%.

added to the mth array element quantified by the efficiency µm = RBB,mm /(RBB,mm + RL,m ),
where RBB,mm is the radiation resistance of the mth antenna.
The level of superdirectivity can be computed based on different metrics, where the
Q factor which quantifies the useful bandwidth of array is used in this work [55]. The Q
factor for Bob’s array can be computed as
Q=

i†B iB
i†B (RBB + RL )iB

,

(3.58)

where iB is the vector of excitation current and {·}† represents the conjugate transpose.
Figure 3.5 plots the Q factor (in dB) as a function of Bob’s array inter-element spacing. A
higher Q factor corresponds to a smaller usable bandwidth which can be improved by adding
loss resistance. Results indicate that a high Q factor is observed when dB < λ/4 with no
added loss resistance (RL = 0). However, it is significantly reduced by adding some loss in
the array such that µ = 0.9.
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Figure 3.5: Q factor as a function of Bob’s antenna element spacing (dB /λ) for two different
values of the antenna element efficiency µ.

Figure 3.6 recreates the plot shown in Figure 3.4 when antenna efficiency is set at
µ1 = µ2 = µ = 0.9 (90%). While the optimal match maximizes the received SNR and
therefore outperforms the diagonal match, the addition of the loss causes the curve for the
optimal match to decrease with the antenna spacing, as expected. Furthermore, as the
element spacing increases and coupling decreases, all curves converge. For the remainder
of this work, results are computed for receive antennas that are 90% efficient. Figure 3.6
also shows the result when Bob’s matching network for minimum noise figure is removed,
meaning that the match is designed for maximum power transfer, causing a reduction in the
SNR. The results show that this suboptimal receiver matching approach leads to a notable
degradation in performance.
Figure 3.6 suggests that the key rate is less sensitive than the communication capacity [29] to the choice of the matching network and the resulting differences in SNR. Despite
this reduced sensitivity to matching quality, optimal matching does increase the key rate
by approximately 10-15%. To see if this improvement occurs over a range of scenarios, IK
is examined as a function of SNR and number of clusters NC in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, respectively for dB = 0.12λ. Both plots confirm the observation from Figure 3.6 that the
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Figure 3.6: Available key rate as a function of Bob’s antenna element spacing (dB /λ) for
three different matching network conditions when the antenna element efficiency µ is assumed
to be 90%.

performance increase of 10-15% created by the optimal match occurs across the range of
parameters considered. The results of Figure 3.8 further reveal that increased multipath
richness (as measured by an increased number of clusters NC ) increases the key rate because
it reduces the channel spatial correlation. However, once the correlation reduces to a certain
level, additional multipaths offer little additional benefit.
3.3.4

Secure Key Rate
Next, the case where an eavesdropper Eve is located close to Bob as shown in Fig-

ure 3.1 is analyzed. The amount of information about the key that Eve can extract based on
her observations of the training exchange depends upon the correlation between hx and hz ,
which is related to the distance between Bob and Eve (dBE ). Two scenarios are analyzed:
high coupling for which dB = dE = 0.12λ and low coupling for which dB = dE = 0.5λ. Both
Bob’s and Eve’s antennas are included together in a single NEC simulation to generate the
radiation patterns and S-parameters that incorporate all coupling mechanisms.

38

30
25
20
15
10
Optimal Match
Diagonal Match
No Mutual Coupling

5

0

5

10

15

20

SNR (dB)

25

Figure 3.7: Available key rate for dB = 0.12λ as a function of SNR when NC = 4.
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Figure 3.8: Available key rate for dB = 0.12λ as a function of the number of clusters NC
when the SNR is 15 dB.
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Figure 3.9: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna
arrays for three different matching network conditions when high coupling (dB = dE = 0.12λ)
is assumed.
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Figure 3.10: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna
arrays for three different matching network conditions when low coupling (dB = dE = 0.5λ) is
assumed.
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Figure 3.11: Secure key rate for dB = dBE = 0.12λ (a) as a function of SNR when NC = 4.

Figures 3.9 and 3.10 plot ISK as a function of the Bob-Eve separation dBE for high
and low coupling, respectively, and for optimal and diagonal matching at Bob. These results
demonstrate that as dBE increases, ISK approaches the value of IK as the channels hx and
hz become less correlated. However, as dBE decreases, ISK decreases significantly due to the
large channel correlation. The results again show that the optimal matching network can
increase the key rate for high coupling by approximately 10-15%. Both plots also show the
results when the minimum noise figure (NF) matching network at Bob is removed. Once
again, performance is reduced by some extent when suboptimal noise matching is used at
the receiver, with the results reinforcing the prior observation that the impact of SNR on
the key rate is not as significant as what is often observed for MIMO capacity [29].
Figure 3.11 plots ISK as a function of SNR. The results observed here are similar to
those observed for sweeping IK across SNR. Figure 3.12 plots ISK as function of the number of
clusters NC . These results show that even for NC = 20, ISK is not saturated which highlights
the fact that a richer multipath environment can enhance the secure key rate even after the
available key rate may already be saturated as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.12: Secure key rate for dB = dE = dBE = 0.12λ as a function of the number of
clusters NC when the SNR is 15 dB.
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Figure 3.13: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna
arrays for two different matching network conditions with dB = dE = 0.12λ and all arrays are
of equal size with Bob’s and Eve’s arrays parallel to each other.
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Figure 3.14: Secure key rate as a function of the separation between Bob’s and Eve’s antenna
arrays for two different matching network conditions with dB = dE = 0.12λ. Bob’s and Eve’s
arrays are perpendicular with NE = 2 and parallel with NE = 4 when NA = NB = 2.

Figure 3.13 plots ISK as a function of the Bob-Eve separation for high coupling with
optimal and diagonal matching at Bob and for NA = NB = NE = 3 and 4. These results
demonstrate that while the secure key rate increases with larger array sizes, the basic trends
are similar to those observed in Figure 3.10. Figure 3.14 plots the same results when all arrays
have two elements but Bob’s and Eve’s arrays are perpendicular as illustrated in the figure,
again confirming similar trends to those shown previously. This plot also shows the results
when Alice and Bob have two antennas while Eve has four, with the antenna arrangement
shown in the figure. Because of Eve’s advantage, ISK is reduced, particularly when Bob
and Eve are very close. However, once the Bob-Eve separation increases, the impact of this
advantage is reduced. Finally, all of the results in Figures 3.13 and 3.14 demonstrate that
under some circumstances, the diagonal match can outperform the optimal match due to
the fact that the optimal matching does not take into account the unknown impact of the
coupling to Eve’s array.
Based on these observations, it is useful to explore the impact of the cross-array
mutual coupling on the key rate performance. The covariances and resulting secure key rate
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are evaluated by assuming that SBE = SEB = 0 and using the radiation patterns for Bob’s
and Eve’s arrays in isolation from each other. Figure 3.15 compares ISK for SBE = 0 and
SBE 6= 0 for both high and low coupling when an optimal matching network is used. As
expected, for large values of dBE where SBE → 0, the curves converge. However, for small
values of dBE , the difference between the two curves increases for both values of array element
spacing. Based on this result the cross-array coupling may
1. create an impedance mismatch that reduces the channel estimation SNR,
2. introduce an additional propagation “path” where the signal routes through the eavesdropper to Bob (or Alice), impacting the spatial correlation among the elements of hx
(or hy ), or
3. change the cross-correlation of the channels hx and hz as represented by the covariance
matrix Rxz .
Items #1 and #2 in the above list will impact IK as well as ISK . Therefore, the data
from the simulations is taken with Eve present, but IK is computed instead of ISK , meaning
that Eve’s impact is included on the channels hx and hy but the computation ignores the
information she may intercept. Figure 3.16(a) plots the ratio of IK when SBE 6= 0 to IK,NC
when SBE = 0 for both high and low coupling. For both coupling levels, as dBE decreases
the cross-array coupling reduces IK relative to the value that exists without coupling. This
implies a reduced SNR value and/or increased correlation among the elements of hx due to
Eve’s presence. However, this reduction in IK is contrary to the increase in ISK observed in
Figure 3.15 when cross-array coupling is included.
To investigate item #3 in the above list, the matrices Rxz and Rxz,NC are computed when SBE 6= 0 (cross-array coupling included) and SBE = 0 (cross-array coupling
neglected), respectively. Since the matrices represent the channel cross-correlations, a lower
matrix Frobenius norm indicates reduced similarly between the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-toEve channels and therefore increased ISK . We form the ratio

γ=E
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Figure 3.15: Secure key rate as a function of dBE with and without cross coupling SBE for
optimal matching networks at Bob and Eve: (a) high coupling (dB = dE = 0.12λ); (b) low
coupling (dB = dE = 0.5λ)
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Figure 3.16: (a) Ratio of IK for SBE 6= 0 to IK when SBE = 0. (b) Average ratio of the
Frobenius norm of Rxz for SBE 6= 0 to that for SBE = 0. Both results use optimal matching
networks at Bob and Eve.
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where k · kF indicates the Frobenius norm. Values of γ below unity indicate that cross-array
coupling reduces the correlation relative to what would be observed if coupling were not
present. Figure 3.16(b) plots γ as a function of dBE , where the expectation is approximated
by averaging over 400 channel realizations. As dBE decreases beyond about λ/4, γ drops
dramatically, indicating that for a given value of dBE inclusion of the cross-array coupling
reduces the correlation between the channels observed by Bob and Eve. This cross-channel
correlation reduction more than offsets the decrease in SNR or increase in correlation among
the elements of hx , resulting in the observed behavior from Figure 3.15 that ISK when crossarray coupling is included is higher than that observed when cross-array coupling is neglected.
Note that this is a reduction relative to what would be observed if cross-array coupling were
ignored, as even with this coupling decreasing separation dBE increases the cross-channel
correlation and reduces the secure key rate.
3.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter shows the analysis of key rate performance of a MIMO communication

system that uses bi-directional channel estimation to establish secret encryption keys. The
analysis incorporates the impact of antenna mutual coupling, the impedance match between
the arrays and the circuitry, and a realistic noise model for LNAs in order to precisely
characterize the overall performance. Moreover, the formulation includes the additional
complexity of an eavesdropper whose antennas may be very close to and therefore coupled
with the antennas of one of the legitimate nodes. The results show that high mutual coupling
impacts the key rate performance, and that use of practical matching can degrade the key
rate performance by 10-15% relative to the performance when less practical but optimal
impedance matching is implemented. Furthermore, the results show that cross coupling
between the arrays of the legitimate node and eavesdropper reduces the correlation between
the channels observed by these two nodes and therefore increases the secure key rate realized.
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Chapter 4
Non-Reciprocal Radio System Calibration for Propagation-Based
Key Establishment
Prior studies on propagation-based key establishment have assumed that the wireless
channel used for key generation is reciprocal and have ignored the fact that typical radios have
different signal paths during transmit and receive, introducing non-reciprocal contributions
to the overall channel that includes the radio analog circuitry. While it is possible to measure
the transfer function of these portions of the circuit in the factory and store them in the
radio for use during key establishment [56], changing environmental conditions and device
aging can alter these responses from their initial values, suggesting the need for a protocol
that allows periodic calibration during radio operation [57].
Because multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communication systems can benefit
from channel reciprocity in certain applications, prior work has appeared on radio calibration. One approach uses dedicated hardware paths to allow periodic measurement of the
transmit and receive circuit transfer functions [58, 59], although this adds hardware complexity and does not incorporate antenna array mutual coupling. An alternate approach
is to use relative calibration based on bidirectional channel estimation and a total least
squares (TLS) calibration algorithm to construct reciprocal channel estimates from the nonreciprocal observations [60, 61], avoiding the deliberate design of calibration circuit paths.
Recent work has demonstrated practical application of the method to MIMO communication algorithms [62]. Despite these contributions, no prior work has appeared illustrating
application of radio calibration to channel-based encryption key establishment.
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the impact of channel non-reciprocity
on propagation-based key establishment performance and to study the effectiveness of a
practical calibration method based on the TLS algorithm that enables the two nodes to obtain
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the same channel estimate despite the non-reciprocal contributions of the radio circuitry. The
MIMO radio system model used for this study is similar to the one used in Chapter 3 and
incorporates transmit sources and receiver loads, impedance matching networks, low-noise
amplifiers (LNAs), mutually coupled antennas, and an eavesdropper [56]. The analysis shows
that non-reciprocal channel contributions from matching networks and LNAs reduces key
establishment performance, but that application of the TLS calibration is highly effective
in removing the impact of such non-reciprocal channel elements over a range of operational
parameters [63, 64]. The training required for effective method implementation increases as
the number of antennas increases or the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) decreases.
4.1

System Model
Figure 4.1 shows the radio model used for this analysis. This model is a modifica-

tion of the model used in Figure 3.1 to study the impact of antenna array mutual coupling
on channel-based key establishment performance. Therefore, only a brief summary of the
analysis is presented in this chapter to highlight the mathematics required to perform system calibration, relying on Fig. 4.1 to define most of the S-parameters and traveling waves
discussed.
Alice and Bob are two radios with NA transmit and NB receive antennas, respectively,
and Eve is a passive eavesdropper with NE receive antennas. Each circuit component is
represented by a S-parameter matrix, and signals are modeled using forward and reverse
traveling waves aξ and bξ respectively, where ξ assumes the different designations shown in
Fig. 4.1. The matching networks either maximize the power transfer to/from the antennas
or minimize the noise figure of the low-noise amplifiers (LNAs). S-parameter matrices of
matching networks and amplifiers are block matrices of the form

S=

S11 S12
S21 S22


,

(4.1)

where Sij relates the vector of waves exiting ports i to the vector of waves incident on ports
j. Furthermore, it is assumed that Eve and Bob can be physically close enough to each other
that their antennas will experience cross-array mutual coupling, leading to a full S-parameter
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Figure 4.1: Network model of a MIMO communication system with legitimate nodes Alice
and Bob and a passive eavesdropper Eve.

matrix for these two antenna arrays of



SBB SBE
SEB SEE


,

(4.2)

where the diagonal terms represent the reflection coefficient matrices for Bob’s and Eve’s
arrays (which include any mutual coupling within the array) and the off-diagonal terms represent cross-array mutual coupling.

Because channel-based key establishment depends on

Alice and Bob both obtaining an estimate of the channel transfer function through training,
both the forward channel (Alice transmitting to Bob) and reverse channel (Bob transmitting
to Alice) transfer functions are formulated.
4.1.1

Forward Channel Transfer Function
Mathematically formulating the forward channel transfer function requires writing an

expression for the output wave aLB as a function of the input wave aTA . To begin, the wave
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incident on Alice’s antenna terminals can be written as
aA = (I − STA,22 SAA )−1 STA,21 aTA ,
|
{z
}

(4.3)

CTA

where I is the identity matrix.
The incoming wave at Bob is
aB = bSB + SBB bB + SBE bE ,

(4.4)

where bSB represents the waves out of Bob’s antennas when they are terminated with
matched loads. To determine bSB and bE , the network theory framework detailed in Chapter 3 is applied. The term bSB can be expressed as
bSB = [(I − SBB )HBA − SBE HEA ] (I − SAA ) aA ,
|
{z
}

(4.5)

FB

where HBA and HEA refer to the physical propagation channels shown in Fig. 4.1. Also, bE
can be constructed as
bE = (I − ΓE SEE )−1 [ΓE bSE + ΓE SEB bB + nE ],

(4.6)

where
bSE = [(I − SEE )HEA − SEB HBA ] (I − SAA ) aA ,
|
{z
}

(4.7)

nE = SRE,12 (I − ΓGE SRE,22 )−1 (bηE − ΓGE aηE ),

(4.8)

FE

ΓGE = SGE,11 + SGE,12 ΓLE (I − SGE,22 ΓLE )−1 SGE,21 ,

(4.9)

ΓE = SRE,11 + SRE,12 ΓGE (I − SRE,22 ΓGE )−1 SRE,21 ,

(4.10)

and the terms aηE and bηE represent the noise contribution from Eve’s LNAs [56].
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Substituting (4.5) and (4.6) into (4.4) and using (4.3) yields,
aB = SBA CTA aTA + ΓBE bB + ΘBE nE ,

(4.11)

ΘBE = SBE (I − ΓE SEE )−1 ,

(4.12)

SBA = FB + ΘBE ΓE FE ,

(4.13)

ΓBE = SBB + ΘBE ΓE SEB .

(4.14)

where

Finally, the outgoing wave aLB from Bob’s LNA can be expressed as
aLB = CRB SBA CTA aTA + η B ,
|
{z
}

(4.15)

Hx

where
CRB = (I − ΓGB ΓLB )−1 ΘGB ΘB ,

(4.16)

ΘB = SRB,21 (I − ΓBE SRB,11 )−1 ,

(4.17)

ΘGB = SGB,21 (I − ΓB SGB,11 )−1 ,

(4.18)

ΓB = SRB,22 + ΘB ΓBE SRB,12 ,

(4.19)

ΓGB = SGB,22 + ΘGB ΓB SGB,12 ,


η B =CRB ΘBE nE + Θ−1
B (ΓB bηB − aηB ) ,

(4.20)
(4.21)

and aηB and bηB model Bob’s LNA noise.
While this analysis involves significant algebraic complexity, the simple final form of
(4.15) represents the noise free channel transfer function in terms of the reciprocal channel
contribution SBA and the non-reciprocal channel contributions CTA and CRB . It is important
to recognize that to compute key establishment performance, the transfer function from
Alice to Eve needs to be formulated. This can be accomplished using a straightforward
modification of (4.15) as detailed in Chapter 3.
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4.1.2

Reverse Channel Transfer Function
The basic analysis for the case of Bob transmitting to Alice mirrors that in Sec-

tion 4.1.1 under the following assumptions:
1. The antennas at all nodes and the propagation media are reciprocal. This means that
T
T
T
SEB = ST
BE , HAB = HBA , and HAE = HEA , where {·} is a matrix transpose. It
T
T
also means that Sξξ = ST
ξξ , where ξ ∈ [A, B, E], and therefore FB and FE describe the

propagation from Bob to Alice and Eve to Alice, respectively.
2. Because Eve is a passive eavesdropper, her radio remains in the same state regardless
of who is transmitting.
3. Bob’s transmit circuitry becomes a matching network to maximize power transfer, and
Alice’s receive circuitry becomes LNAs (including the minimum noise figure matching
network) and terminations.
4. Eve’s LNA noise is insignificant relative to Alice’s LNA noise and therefore is disregarded in the analysis.
5. The directions of aξ and bξ for ξ ∈ [A, B] are reversed and the signal incident on Bob’s
matching network is designated as aTB and that incident on Alice’s loads is designated
as aLA . If a symbol used in this analysis is the same as a symbol used in Section 4.1.1
but with a change in subscript (A to B or B to A), then the subscripts are changed
within any expressions defining those symbols.
These assumptions allow a relatively simple summary of the analysis. First, aB can
be written as
aB = (I − STB,22 ΓBE )−1 STB,21 aTB ,
{z
}
|

(4.22)

CTB

where in comparison with (4.3), ΓBE has replaced the role of the transmit antenna reflection
coefficient matrix because of the coupling between Bob and Eve.
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When constructing bE , the analysis leading to (4.6) can be used without the noise or
the term due to propagation from Alice. The result is
bE = (I − ΓE SEE )−1 ΓE SEB CTB aTB .

(4.23)

The signal out of Alice’s antennas when terminated with matched loads is then
T
bSA = FT
B bB + FE bE .

(4.24)

Using these results, the final reverse transfer function becomes
aLA = CRA SAB CTB aTB + η A ,
|
{z
}

(4.25)

CRA = (I − ΓGA ΓLA )−1 ΘGA ΘA ,

(4.26)

η A = CRA Θ−1
A (ΓA bηA − aηA ).

(4.27)

Hy

where

4.2

Calibration Algorithm and Performance
The goal of system calibration is to remove the differences between the channels ob-

served by Alice and Bob due to non-reciprocity, recognizing that each will be estimating
their channels independently and therefore subject to independent channel estimation errors. From (4.15) and (4.25), and recognizing that because of the assumptions of reciprocal
antennas and propagation media SAB = ST
BA , Hx can be written as
Hx = CRB C−T
HT C−T C .
| {z TB} y | RA{z TA}
CA

(4.28)

CB

The calibration objective is to find the calibration matrices CA and CB such that Alice
can compute an estimate of Hx based on her estimate of Hy . Since both Alice and Bob then
have the same channel estimate (ignoring noise/channel estimation errors), they can each
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use their estimate to form a secret encryption key. Of course, inaccurate construction of
the calibration matrices will diminish the agreement of the keys created at each radio and
therefore reduce key establishment performance. The metrics that quantify this performance
are provided in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1

Total Least Squares (TLS) Calibration
Calibration involves K channel measurements. During the kth measurement, Alice

and Bob exchange pilot signals from which Bob estimates Ĥx,k and Alice estimates Ĥy,k ,
where {ˆ·} is used to designate that the quantity is an estimate. Bob transmits his estimate
Ĥx,k to Alice so that she knows both channel estimates. Note that, since Bob transmits his
channel estimate publicly, the channel estimates used during calibration cannot be used for
key establishment.
For the kth measurement (4.28) can be re-written as
T
Ĥx,k C−1
B − CA Ĥy,k = 0

(4.29)

or equivalently as


i vec{C−1 }
h
B
 = 0,
INA ⊗ Ĥx,k − Ĥy,k ⊗ INB 
|
{z
} vec{CA }
Lk
|
{z
}

(4.30)

c

where ⊗ is a Kronecker product, IN is an N × N identity matrix, and vec{·} forms a column
vector by stacking its argument columnwise. Stacking all K measurements into a single
matrix expression produces the overdetermined system
T
L1 T . . . LK T c = 0.
|
{z
}



(4.31)

L

Eq. (4.31) can be solved using TLS [60]. The number of channel measurements required for
calibration are chosen such that K > NB /NA +NA /NB , and the singular value decomposition
L = UΣVH is performed, where U and V are unitary matrices of singular vectors and Σ is
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a diagonal matrix of real singular values. The estimate ĉ of c is a scalar α times the singular
vector of V corresponding to the smallest singular value in Σ. According to (4.30), the
unknown scalar α is in the numerator and denominator of the estimated calibration matrices
ĈA and ĈB , respectively. It therefore disappears when Alice computes the calibrated reverse
channel
Ĥx0 = ĈA ĤT
y ĈB

(4.32)

based on her channel estimate Ĥy . In the absence of estimation errors, Hx0 = Hx , and
therefore Bob and Alice have the same channel coefficients for encryption key generation.
4.2.2

Key Rate
The information theoretic key rate represents the theoretical maximum number of

key bits that can be generated from a single observation of the channel by Alice and Bob.
The available key rate IK ignores the presence of Eve and therefore effectively quantifies the
similarity between the final channel estimates. For Gaussian channel coefficients and letting
Ĥr represent the reverse channel estimate, IK can be computed in closed form [17] as
IK = I(ĥx ; ĥr ) = log2

|R̂xx ||R̂rr |
|R̂XR |

,

(4.33)

where ĥx = vec{Ĥx }, ĥr = vec{Ĥr }, | · | is the determinant, I(·; ·) is the mutual information,
n
o
R̂ξψ = E ĥξ ĥ†ψ , E {·} is an expectation, {·}† is a conjugate transpose, and
n
o
R̂XR = E [ĥ†x ĥ†r ]† [ĥ†x ĥ†r ] .

(4.34)

The secure key rate ISK quantifies the number of key bits that can be generated per
channel observation that are secure from the eavesdropper and is given by
ISK = I(ĥx ; ĥr |ĥz ) = log2
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|R̂XZ ||R̂RZ |
|R̂zz ||R̂XRZ |

,

(4.35)

where ĥz is the columnwise stacked version of the channel observed by Eve and the covariances with upper case subscripts are defined based on (4.34). Details on the computation
of the signal and noise covariance matrices required to compute IK and ISK are presented in
Chapter 2.
4.3

Performance Evaluation
Simulations are used to demonstrate the performance of the calibration procedure.

Several aspects of the simulations require some discussion.
4.3.1

Matching Network Design
All matching networks are designed such that they are lossless and reciprocal, and

the design procedure is detailed in Appendix A for maximizing power transfer or minimizing
LNA noise figure. As discussed in Chapter 3, two different levels of matching network design
complexity are considered in this work. The Optimal Matching Network (OMN) is designed
using the full S-parameter matrix of the antenna array and therefore introduces cross-port
coupling to compensate for the antenna coupling. The Diagonal Matching Network (DMN)
is designed using only the diagonal elements of the array S-parameter matrix, meaning that
when coupling is significant, the matching network will not achieve the design goal (maximum
power or minimum noise figure).
In the following, when the matching is specified as OMN or DMN, it applies to the
matching network at both Alice and Bob. When computing ISK , Eve is given the advantage
of always having an optimal minimum noise figure matching network with the assumption
that there is no error in her knowledge of her calibration matrices.
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4.3.2

Calibration Error Modeling
The S-parameters of a lossless, reciprocal matching network can be expressed as [56]
1/2

S11 = U11 Λ11 UT
11
S12 = jU11 (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
22
S21 = jU22 (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
11
1/2

S22 = U22 Λ11 UT
22 ,

(4.36)

where Uii is the unitary matrix of left singular vectors of Sii and Λ11 is the diagonal matrix
of real singular values of S11 . The design procedure in Appendix A specifies these matrices
based on the design goals. Once they are specified, phase error can be introduced into the
design through the simple transformations
U11 = P(1) U11 P(2) ,
U22 = P(3) U22 P(4) ,

(4.37)

where P(i) is the ith realization of a diagonal matrix with mth diagonal entry ejφm , φm is
an independent random variable uniformly distributed over [−φmax , φmax ], and φmax is the
maximum phase error. Modified matching network S-parameters are computed from (4.36)
with Uii in place of Uii .
The modified S-parameters are used to compute the forward and reverse channels
observed by Alice and Bob, and the calibration procedure is applied to these observations
to estimate the calibration matrices for these modified channels. In a real system, because
different matching networks are used by a radio depending on whether it is transmitting or
receiving, the S-parameters will drift independently for forward and reverse channels, and
therefore that is the default behavior in the simulations. However, the case where only the
S-parameters for the reverse channel drift is also considered to demonstrate the impact of this
error introduction without the added complexity of error being modeled in both channels.
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The gain errors can also be introduced in the model through the LNA gains. However,
simulations show that such gain errors have minimal impact on performance, and therefore
all simulations shown here are limited to the case of matching network phase errors.
4.3.3

Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
(10λ)

SNR is defined in two different ways. In the first case, the channel covariance Rξξ

for ξ ∈ [x, y, z] is computed assuming the array element spacing is dξ = 10λ, where λ is the
(10λ)

free space wavelength, and the noise covariance Rη,ξξ is scaled such that the SNR computed
as
n
o n
o
(10λ)
(10λ)
SNR10λ = Tr Rξξ
/Tr Rη,ξξ

(4.38)

achieves the specified value, where Tr{·} is the matrix trace. Once this noise is specified, it
is used for all antenna configurations and therefore demonstrates the impact of reduced SNR
due to imperfect impedance matching. In the second case, the channel covariance matrix
Rξξ is computed for each antenna spacing and the noise covariance Rη,ξξ is scaled such that
the SNR computed as
SNRC = Tr{Rξξ }/Tr{Rη,ξξ }

(4.39)

achieves the specified value for each spacing. This definition removes changes in SNR as a
factor in determining the key rate. Unless otherwise stated, a SNR of 15 dB is used.
4.3.4

Results
In all simulations, the antennas are half-wave dipoles (λ/2), and unless otherwise

stated, NA = NB = NE = 2. The element spacing for Alice is dA = λ/2, while dB and dE
can vary (see inset in Fig. 4.1). When computing ISK , the separation dBE also varies. All
antennas are modelled using the Numerical Electromagnetics Code (NEC) to obtain their
open-circuit radiation patterns and full (coupled) S-parameter matrices. The arrays of Bob
and Eve are simulated as a single array to capture the cross-array mutual coupling. The
propagation channel is realized using a simple path based model, where NP = 10 distinct
paths are realized, each with its own complex gain, angle of departure, and angle of arrival.
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Figure 4.2: Available key rate IK as a function of the maximum phase error φmax for the
Reference and Error scenarios when error is applied to the reverse (Rev) or both the forward and
reverse (Fw, Rev) channels for both optimal (OMN) and diagonal (DMN) matching networks
when SNR10λ = 15 dB.

For simplicity, it is assumed that path gains and angle of arrival/departure are the same at
both Bob and Eve.
Results for three channel reciprocity conditions appear in the following. For the
Reference condition, ĥr = ĥx , meaning the forward and reverse channels are identical. Note
that if errors are introduced in the forward channel ĥx , then the forward channel impedance
match will be degraded and performance will decrease. For the Error condition, the errors
are introduced in the channels but calibration is not applied before computing the key rates,
or ĥr = ĥy . Finally, for the Calibration condition, it is assumed that ĥr = ĥx0 which is
computed using TLS calibration. Unless otherwise stated, K = 50 channel realizations are
used for calibration.
It is first useful to demonstrate the impact of calibration matrix error on the key rate
IK as a function of the maximum phase error φmax . Figure 4.2 plots the results averaged
over NR = 10, 000 error realizations of U11 and U22 , where φm is uniformly distributed for
dB = 1λ and SNR10λ = 15 dB for both Reference and Error conditions and when errors are
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Figure 4.3: Available key rate IK for Case 1 as a function of Bob’s array spacing dB when
either SNRC or SNR10λ are fixed at 15 dB for both optimal (OMN) and diagonal (DMN)
matching networks.

applied only to the reverse channel or to both. Note that when errors are applied only to
the reverse channel, the Reference condition suffers no degradation as the reverse channel
for Reference case is set to the forward channel, where the forward channel is error free.
However, for Error case the reverse channel is not set to the forward channel, and we see
performance degradation due to the error in the reverse channel.
When the forward channel also has errors, the Reference case suffers because of the
imperfect match, although the forward and reverse channels are same. It is also noticed that
introducing phase errors in both channels effectively doubles the penalty relative to errors
in only the reverse channel, and that the performance using OMN is more sensitive to errors
than when using DMN, likely because it takes little perturbation to disturb the perfect design
whereas the DMN is suboptimal even without the introduction of explicit errors. Finally,
Fig. 4.2 shows that the key rate degradation with phase error can be significant. Based on
these results, the remaining simulations use φmax = 45◦ .
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Figure 4.4: Achieved average SNRC as a function of Bob’s array spacing dB for forward (ĥx ),
reverse (ĥy ) and calibrated channel (ĥx0 ) covariance matrices when SNR10λ = 15 dB for both
optimal (OMN) and diagonal (DMN) matching networks.

Case 1 – Error in Reverse Channel
It is first assumed that calibration errors are introduced only in the reverse channel,
meaning that the Reference result suffers no impedance mismatch. Figure 4.3 plots the
available key rate IK versus Bob’s array spacing dB when Bob has an optimal or diagonal
matching network for both SNR10λ = 15 dB and SNRC = 15 dB. These results reveal that
while incorporation of error reduces IK by approximately 5%, application of the TLS calibration effectively recovers all of the lost performance. The overall performance degradation
for diagonal matching relative to that for optimal matching observed when SNR10λ is held
constant is simply a result of the fact that the non-exact diagonal matching has a lower
realized SNR when antenna coupling is high. Regardless, the TLS calibration is effective for
both types of matching network.
The observed reduction in IK created by calibration error can be caused by 1) SNR
mismatch between the forward and reverse channels (observed only when using SNR10λ ), 2)
increased correlation within the elements of the reverse channel vector ĥy , and/or 3) reduced
correlation between the forward and reverse channels ĥx and ĥy . Therefore each of these
61

(a)

Correlation

0.6
0.4

Cross-correlation

0.2
0
1 (b)

0.8
Diagonal

0.6

Off-diagonal

0.4
0.2
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

Figure 4.5: (a) Maximum correlation coefficient within each channel and (b) average diagonal
and off-diagonal cross correlation coefficient between forward and reverse channels (ĥx , ĥy ) and
forward and calibrated channels (ĥx , ĥx0 ) as a function of Bob’s array spacing dB .

.

contributors are explored. Figure 4.4 plots SNRC for the forward, reverse, and calibrated
channel covariance matrices. These results reveal that an SNR mismatch occurs, with the
reverse channel SNR being lower for the optimal match for high coupling (dB < 0.4λ) and
higher for the diagonal match for low coupling (dB > 0.3λ). Given this observation, for the
remainder of this chapter, this SNR inconsistency is removed by setting SNRC = 15 dB so
that SNR is independent of antenna coupling and matching.
Next, the correlation is considered. The off-diagonal elements of the matrix Rξξ quantify the similarity between different channel coefficients within a single channel, with higher
correlation resulting in reduced key rate since it means that each channel coefficient offers
reduced independent information. Figure 4.5(a) plots the maximum correlation coefficient
(normalized correlation with a peak of unity) taken from all off-diagonal elements of the
correlation matrix for the forward, reverse and calibrated channels. Recalling that only the
reverse channel has errors introduced, it is observed that these errors increase the channel
correlation, but that the calibration effectively reduces the correlation back to the levels of

62

16

DMN

OMN

14

12

Reference
Error
Calibration

10

0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

1

1.2 0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

Figure 4.6: Secure key rate ISK as a function of the Bob-Eve array separation dBE (dB =
0.12λ) for Case 1 for both optimal (OMN) and diagonal (DMN) matching networks.

the error-free forward channel. Figure 4.5(b) plots the averaged cross correlation coefficient
between the channel pairs (ĥx , ĥy ) and (ĥx , ĥx0 ). The error reduces the diagonal entries in
the cross-correlation, which represents the correlation between the same channel coefficients
observed by Alice and Bob (desired to be one). The error also increases the correlation
between different channel coefficients, which is undesired for key establishment. However,
once again, the calibration improves the overall correlation.
Finally, Figure 4.6 plots ISK as a function of the Bob-Eve array spacing dBE when
dB = 0.12λ. As previously indicated, Eve’s calibration is assumed perfect, but the impact
of calibration errors in the reverse channel due to Bob and Alice reduces IK as well as
ISK . As expected, TLS calibration overcomes the reduced performance in terms of ISK for
both matching network types. Since the Reference and Calibration results are virtually
indistinguishable, the Reference results are omitted for the remainder of this chapter.
Case 2 – Error in Forward and Reverse Channels
While including error only in the reverse channel has allowed to study the impact of
channel errors and calibration on the underlying contributors to key rate, such a situation
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Figure 4.7: Available key rate IK as a function of dB and secure key rate ISK as a function of
dBE (dB = 0.12λ) when calibration error is applied to the reverse channel (Case 1) and both
forward and reverse channel (Case 2) for optimal matching networks..

is not realistic. In this case, errors are included in both forward and reverse channels.
Figure 4.7 compares both key rates for Cases 1 and 2 for optimal matching networks. As
expected IK reduces beyond that observed for Case 1 as error is incorporated in the forward
channel, although the relative difference between the Error and Calibration results remains
approximately the same. While it may seem that the Calibration results should be identical
for both Cases 1 and 2, it is important to remember that the calibration simply makes the
forward and reverse channels the same, but it can not compensate for the SNR reduction
created by errors in the matching network. Figure 4.8 presents a similar comparison when
diagonal matching networks are used. Overall the results are similar to the one observed for
the optimal matching network, apart from the fact that impact of error is slightly reduced
due to the fact that the diagonal matching networks are already suboptimal.
This case is also used to explore the impact of increasing the array size as well as using
different numbers of channel observations during the calibration phase. Since the matching
network type does not materially impact the trends observed, only the diagonal matching
networks are used for this analysis. Figure 4.9 plots the key rates for NA = NB = NE = 3
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Figure 4.8: Available key rate IK as a function of dB and secure key rate ISK as a function of
dBE (dB = 0.12λ) when calibration error is applied to the reverse channel (Case 1) and both
forward and reverse channel (Case 2) for diagonal matching networks..

and for K = 10 and 50. The Reference results are included here, as using K = 10 does not
achieve error free calibration under any conditions and even using K = 50 does not achieve
perfect calibration for certain conditions with the larger array sizes. These results suggest
that with larger array sizes, more channel observations are required to achieve accurate
calibration.
Finally, the fractional error (IK,Ref − IK,Cal )/IK,Ref is computed, where ‘Ref’ indicates
Reference and ‘Cal’ indicates Calibration results. Figure 4.10 plots the percentage fractional
error as a function of SNRC when there is high (dB = 0.12λ) and low (dB = 1λ) mutual
coupling in Bob’s array for NA = NB = 3. The curve marked ‘Error’ is computed by
substituting IK for the Error result in place of IK,Cal . Results for different numbers of
channel observations used in the calibration phase demonstrate that the error increases for
low K, especially at low SNR. The results also show that reduced antenna mutual coupling
reduces the complexity of the calibration estimation since fewer channel observations are
required to achieve the same error performance.
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Figure 4.9: Available key rate IK as a function of dB and secure key rate ISK as a function of
dBE (dB = 0.12λ) when K = 10 or 50, where calibration error is added in both transmit and
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Figure 4.11: Available key rate IK as a function of dB and secure key rate ISK as a function
of dBE (dB = 0.12λ) error is applied only to the receive matching network (Case 3) versus both
transmit and receive matching networks (Case 2) for optimal matching networks.

Case 3 – Error in Receiver
As a final case, calibration error is assumed in both the forward and reverse channels
but only incorporated into the minimum noise figure matching network at the receivers.
Figure 4.11 compares both key rates for Cases 2 and 3 for optimal matching networks.
While the overall reduction in channel error does increase the key rates for both cases, the
fact that this increase in key rate is small suggests that errors at the receiver dominate
the performance under the SNR normalization protocol. Figure 4.12 presents a similar
comparison when diagonal matching networks are used. Once again, the impact of the
errors is reduced due to the suboptimal diagonal matching.
4.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter formulates a detailed model of a wireless communication system that

incorporates non-reciprocal contributions to the channel transfer function due to the radio
frequency circuitry and uses the model to demonstrate the performance degradation created
by the non-reciprocal channel elements for propagation-based secret key establishment. It
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Figure 4.12: Available key rate IK as a function of dB and secure key rate ISK as a function
of dBE (dB = 0.12λ) when error is applied only to the receive matching network (Case 3) versus
both transmit and receive matching networks (Case 2) for diagonal matching networks.

also explores use of a TLS calibration method that allows one of the two radios to estimate
the non-reciprocal contributors to the channel and use them to compute a channel transfer
function that matches that observed by the other radio. Simulation results show that the
method is effective and enables high key establishment performance. However, as the number
of antennas or the degree of mutual coupling increases and as SNR decreases, the complexity
of the calibration phase must increase in order to maintain performance. Overall, the method
appears practical for implementation in operational radio systems.
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Chapter 5
Impact of Propagation on the Vulnerability of Channel-Based Key
Establishment
5.1

Introduction
While the performance of key generation is bounded by the available key rate, this

quantity ignores the information about the key inferred by a passive eavesdropper whose
channel is correlated with that between the two communicating nodes. This deficiency can be
overcome by bounding performance using the more realistic secure key rate that incorporates
the impact of this correlation [17]. Chapters 3 and 4 have focused on the impact of mutual
coupling and reciprocity on key generation using the wireless propagation channel and have
used both available key rate and secure key rate to quantize the performance, but with little
real commentary on the relationship between these quantities.
The secure key rate as a performance metric is optimal, but the legitimate nodes
do not possess information regarding the eavesdropper channel observations and therefore
cannot compute this quantity. Furthermore, recent work has identified techniques for maximizing the available key rate, but these techniques have not been applied to the secure
key rate due to its more complicated mathematical form [65, 66]. It is therefore useful to
explore the quantitative relationship between the available and secure key rates for different
propagation conditions to enable understanding regarding when it is acceptable to use the
available key rate as a surrogate for the more complex secure key rate. While recent work has
provided some simple simulations and measurements that provide such a comparison [17, 38],
past simulations have given little consideration to different propagation conditions, and past
experiments provide too limited an opportunity to explore the impact of these conditions on
the observed differences in the key rates.
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This chapter analyzes the relationship between available and secure key rates by first
formulating a model from which these key rates can be computed. The analysis extends
recent work on analytical computation of multi-antenna spatial correlation [28] to a multiuser scenario where the multipath structure at one of the legitimate nodes and a nearby
eavesdropper has related but different characteristics. This formulation is then used with
an experimentally-validated cluster-based model of the propagation that provides the relationship between the multipath characteristics at the two displaced nodes [52]. Finally, this
combined model is applied to explore the impact of propagation and system conditions such
as K-factor, cluster angular spread, and array sizes on the different key rates. The results
show that the simpler available key rate is a reasonably accurate representation of the secure
key rate provided that the separation between the eavesdropper and a legitimate node is
greater than 2.5 wavelengths and the propagation K-factor is lower than 0 dB. The results
also show that using a simple model for the multipath where the eavesdropper and nearby
legitimate node observe the same multipath characteristics can significantly over predict the
fraction of bits that are vulnerable to the eavesdropper.
5.2

System Model and Analysis
Figure 5.1 presents the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communication model

considered, where Alice and Bob use NA and NB antennas, respectively, to communicate securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Eve) who observes the communication using
NE antennas. In comparison with Chapters 3 and 4, a simplified system model is considered
in this work to focus on the propagation channel. Furthermore, slightly different notation
is used in this chapter for the propagation channel and covariance matrices to make the
(B)

mathematical analysis more clear and understandable. The element Hmn of the NB × NA
matrix H(B) is the narrowband transfer impedance that gives the open-circuit voltage on
Bob’s mth antenna for unit driving current on Alice’s nth antenna. If the NB × NA matrix
H(A) similarly represents a transfer impedance for transmission from Bob to Alice arranged
such that the matrix element row and column indices again correspond to the antenna indices at Bob and Alice, respectively, then for reciprocal antennas and propagation media,
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Figure 5.1: System model in which Alice and Bob use multiple antennas to communicate in
the presence of a multi-antenna passive eavesdropper Eve.

H(B) = H(A) . Similar definitions exist for the NE × NA matrix H(E) and NE × NB matrix
0

H(E ) shown in Figure 5.1.
Alice and Bob each in turn transmit known training sequences to the other at the same
frequency. Alice uses her received waveform to form her estimate Ĥ(A) of the actual channel
H(A) , and Bob similarly forms the estimate Ĥ(B) of the actual channel H(B) . This training
0

allows Eve to obtain estimates Ĥ(E) and Ĥ(E ) of her channels. Effectively, the objective is to
determine the conditions under which Eve’s channel estimates provide information regarding
the channel H(B) = H(A) and therefore about the key established by Alice and Bob.
Due to the notational differences from the expressions of IK and ISK presented in
Chapter 3, we explicitly specify the expressions used to compute key rate metrics here. The
available key rate IK can be computed from [17]
IK = I(ĥ(B) ; ĥ(A) ) = log2

|R̂(BB) ||R̂(AA) |
|K̂BA |

,

(5.1)

where ĥ(ξ) is a vector formed by stacking Ĥ(ξ) columnwise for ξ ∈ [A, B, E], I(·; ·) is the
mutual information, and | · | is the determinant. The covariances in the numerator are
n
o
R̂(ξξ) = E ĥ(ξ) ĥ(ξ)† = R(ξξ) + σξ2 I
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(5.2)

for ξ ∈ [A, B, E] where E {·} is an expectation, {·}† is a conjugate transpose, R(ξξ) =

E h(ξ) h(ξ)† , I is the identity matrix, and σξ2 is the variance of the zero-mean complex
Gaussian error observed for channel estimate ĥ(ξ) . The quantity used in the denominator of
(4.33) is notation for
n
o
K̂X1 X2 ...XN = E ĥX1 X2 ...XN ĥ†X1 X2 ...XN ,
where ĥX1 X2 ...XN =

h

ĥ(X1 )† ĥ(X2 )† . . . ĥ(XN )†

i†

(5.3)

.

In this work it is assumed that Eve is located near Bob and that both are far from
0

Alice. This means that H(E ) and H(B) are uncorrelated in any practical environment, consistent with prior findings [17]. However, since H(E) may be correlated with H(B) , the secure
key rate is defined as the maximum number of bits that can be generated per observation of
the channel that are secure from Eve, which can be computed from [17]
ISK = I(ĥ(B) ; ĥ(A) |ĥ(E) ) = log2

|K̂BE ||K̂AE |
|R̂(EE) ||K̂BAE |

.

(5.4)

Lastly, the number of vulnerable key bits are defined as
IVK = IK − ISK .
5.2.1

R(BE)

(5.5)

Multi-Channel Covariance Formulation
Computation of ISK in (5.4) requires construction of the channel cross-covariance

= E h(B) h(E)† in addition to the auto-covariances R(ξξ) for ξ ∈ [A, B, E]. While the

auto-covariances can be computed easily in closed form based on the antenna field radiation
patterns and the power angular spectrum (PAS) of the multipath propagation [28], accurate
computation of ISK requires not only properly modeling the relationship between the fields
(via the PAS) at Bob and at Eve but also constructing the cross-covariance based on that
model. Therefore this work extends the procedure provided in [28] to the multi-user case.

72

As taught in [28], the notation Ω = (θ, φ) is used to represent angular coordinates
and describe the propagation between Alice and Bob using the dyadic function

(B)

β


(ΩB , ΩA ) = 

(B)
βθθ (ΩB , ΩA )

(B)
βθφ (ΩB , ΩA )

(B)
βφθ (ΩB , ΩA )

(B)
βφφ (ΩB , ΩA )



,

(5.6)

(B)

where each dyad entry βuv (ΩB , ΩA ) represents the complex gain for a multipath component
departing from Alice at the angle ΩA with polarization v ∈ [θ, φ] and arriving at Bob at
the angle ΩB with polarization u ∈ [θ, φ] [67, 68]. For notational simplicity, the shorthand
Ωξξ0 = (Ωξ , Ωξ0 ) is used in this work.
(B)

The dyad β

is stacked columnwise to form the column vector b(B) (ΩB , ΩA ). Ex-

pressing the radiation patterns of the nth transmit and mth receive antennas as column
(A)

(B)

vectors sn (ΩA ) and sm (ΩB ), respectively, where the vector elements correspond to the two
far-field electromagnetic polarizations, we can write
(B)
Hmn

(BA)

(B)

Z
=

s(BA)T
(ΩBA )b(B) (ΩBA ) dΩBA ,
mn

(5.7)

(A)

where smn (ΩBA ) = sm (ΩB ) ⊗ sn (ΩA ), ⊗ represents a Kronecker product, and {·}T is a
transpose. Using similar definitions, we can write
(E)
Hpq

Z
=

s(EA)T
(ΩEA )b(E) (ΩEA ) dΩEA .
pq

(5.8)

The assumption that Bob and Eve are in close proximity to one another allows us
to express the arriving fields and antenna radiation patterns for Bob and Eve in a common
coordinate frame, or ΩE = ΩB . Based on [28], each element of R(BE) can be written using
(5.7) and (5.8) as
 (B) (E)∗
(BE)
Hpq
Rmn,pq
= E Hmn
Z Z
=
s(BA)T
(ΩBA )P(BE) (ΩBA ; Ω0BA )s(EA)∗
(Ω0BA ) dΩBA dΩ0BA ,
mn
pq
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(5.9)
(5.10)

where {·}∗ represents a conjugate and

P(BE) (ΩBA ; Ω0BA ) = E b(B) (ΩBA )b(E)† (Ω0BA ) .

(5.11)

Given the similarity between the quantity in (5.11) and the traditional PAS, P(BE) (ΩBA ; Ω0BA )
is referred to as the cross power angular spectrum (CPAS) that measures the statistical similarity between the propagation characteristics observed at Bob and Eve given transmission
from Alice.
5.2.2

CPAS Formulation
The next step in the analysis is to formulate the CPAS and subsequently construct

the cross-covariance in (5.10). While different models could be used for this formulation,
this work uses an experimentally-validated autoregressive (AR) model that describes how
the gain, angle of departure, and angle of arrival of the multipath components evolve with
time as the nodes move through an environment [52]. The model includes appearance of
new multipaths and disappearance of existing ones. Specifically, the cluster gains, AOA,
and AOD are extracted from the measured data and then each parameter is described by
a single wide-sense stationary stochastic representation which consists of the probability
density function (pdf) approximated by a histogram and the power spectral density (PSD).
The PSD is then computed as
Pγ (z) = Hγ (z)Hγ∗ (1/z ∗ ),

(5.12)

where {.}∗ is the conjugate. It is assumed that Hγ (z) can be expressed using an AR model
as
Hγ (z) =

1 + aγ,1

z −1

bγ (z)
,
+ aγ,2 z −2 + ... + aγ,p z −p

(5.13)

where bγ and aγ,i for 1 6 i 6 p are unknown coefficients. Table 5.1 shows the coefficients
used in the AR model to estimate the PSD for the AOA, the AOD, and the power gain using
the order p = 3, 4, and 3, respectively [52]. The principles associated with this model that
are relevant for constructing the CPAS are:
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Table 5.1: Coefficients for estimating the power spectral density for each cluster parameter.

γ
aγ,1
aγ,2
aγ,3
aγ,4
bγ

AOD
-2.8918
2.7704
-0.8604
-0.0182
6.0594×10−4

AOA
-2.9023
2.8082
-0.9058

Power Gain
-1.8902
0.8208
0.0742

4.0648×10−4

0.023

1. Different groups of approximately 50 multipaths are clustered together in that their
angles of departure and arrival and complex amplitudes (gains) are drawn from common statistical distributions. This enables us to write the ith element of the vector
b(ξ) as
(ξ)
bi (ΩBA )

=

L
X

(ξ) (ξ)

α`i b`i (ΩBA ),

(5.14)

`=1
(ξ)

where ξ ∈ [B, E], L is the total number of clusters, b`i (ΩBA ) is the transfer function
n
o
(ξ)
(ξ)∗
for the `th cluster normalized such that the integral of E b`i (ΩBA )b`i (ΩBA ) over
(ξ)

ΩB and ΩA is unity, and α`i represents a real scalar that sets the relative peak (in
terms of field magnitude) of the `th cluster.
2. The gains of different multipaths within a cluster or across different clusters (including
those for different polarizations [27]) are statistically uncorrelated, or
n
o
(B)
(B)∗
E b`i (ΩBA )b`0 j (Ω0BA ) = 0 ` 6= `0 , i 6= j
o
n
(B)
(B)∗
(B)
0
E b`i (ΩBA )b`i (ΩBA ) = B`i (ΩBA )δ(ΩBA − Ω0BA ),

(5.15)
(5.16)

where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function and the PAS is
(B)
B`i (ΩBA )

n
o
(B)
(B)∗
= E b`i (ΩBA )b`i (ΩBA ) .

(5.17)

3. As a node moves, the departure/arrival angles and peak of each cluster shift continuously. The AR model achieves good results by moving all multipaths within the
cluster by the same angular offsets and multiplying their gains by the same real scalar.
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Therefore, when Bob and Eve are displaced,
(E)

(B)

b`i (ΩB , ΩA ) = b`i (ΩB − ∆ΩB,`i , ΩA − ∆ΩA,`i ),

(5.18)

where ∆Ωξ,`i is the angular shift of the `th cluster in departure (ξ = A) and arrival
(ξ = B) angle.
Using these results, the CPAS in (5.11) is diagonal with elements given by
(BE)

Pii

(ΩBA ; Ω0BA ) =

L
X

(BC)

Γ`i

(B)

B`i (ΩBA )δ(ΩB − Ω0B + ∆ΩB,`i )δ(ΩA − Ω0A + ∆ΩA,`i ), (5.19)

`=1
(BE)

where Γ`i

(B)

(E)∗

= α`i α`i .
(BE)

With this representation of the CPAS, we can define the diagonal matrices Γ`
(B)

(BE)

and B` (ΩBA ) with ith diagonal elements Γ`i

(B)

and B`i (ΩBA ), respectively. The notation

(EA)

spq (ΩBA + ∆ΩBA,` ) is further used to represent the vector with ith element
(EA)

spq,i (ΩB + ∆ΩB,`i , ΩA + ∆ΩA,`i ).

(5.20)

(EA)

The boldface ∆ means that each element of the vector spq (ΩBA ) is evaluated at a unique
angular offset, and the indexing in ` means that these offsets are further unique for each
cluster. The final form of the covariance is therefore
(BE)
Rmn,pq

=

L Z
X

(BE)

s(BA)T
(ΩBA )Γ`
mn

(B)

B` (ΩBA )s(EA)∗
(ΩBA + ∆ΩBA,` ) dΩBA .
pq

(5.21)

`=1

5.3

Analysis
The above presented model is used to explore the difference between the available and

secure key rates IK and ISK , respectively, for different propagation conditions. Throughout
the analysis, it is assumed that each node is equipped with an array of half-wave (λ/2) dipole
antennas, where λ is the free-space wavelength. Unless otherwise indicated, the antenna
mutual coupling is neglected. Because the focus of this work is the impact of propagation
conditions on the information about the Alice-Bob channel that Eve can obtain from her
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channel observations, Bob and Eve are close to one another and separated by a distance dBE
using the arrangement shown in Figure 5.1. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for each channel
is defined as SNRξ = Tr(R(ξξ) )/Nξ σξ2 for ξ ∈ [A, B, E] where Tr(·) is the matrix trace, and
σξ2 is computed to achieve a specified SNR. It is assumed that Alice and Bob have the same
SNR of 15 dB. Since Eve is close to Bob and because the focus is on the impact of channel
spatial characteristics, it is also assumed that Eve has an SNR of 15 dB. Naturally, if Eve
has an SNR advantage (disadvantage), then the value of ISK will be lower (higher) than the
values reported here.
5.3.1

Multi-User Propagation Description
For simplicity, the propagation is restricted to vertically-polarized fields traveling

parallel to the azimuth plane (θξ = 90◦ ). Each cluster is modeled in the PAS as a truncated
Laplacian function [28] with a specified angular spread (AS). A line-of-sight (LOS) path is
(BB)

added into the model with gain Γ0

resulting in the K-factor defined by

K=

1

L
X

(BB)
Γ0
`=1

(BB)

Γ`

.

(5.22)

The gain of each multipath in a cluster is a zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian random variable scaled by the time-variant cluster gain coefficient provided by the model, and therefore
the overall channel coefficient statistics are Gaussian as required for the key rate expressions.
The AR model detailed in [52] stochastically generates the cluster gains and central
departure and arrival angles for the channel from Alice to Bob and then evolves these cluster
parameters as Eve moves away from Bob. The model allows specification of the number of
clusters LB at Bob, but as dBE increases, the model stochastically generates new clusters
(birth) or eliminates existing clusters (death), meaning that the total number of clusters at
Eve may differ from LB . Figure 5.2 plots an example which shows the evolution of clusters
at Eve over time. In the start for dBE = 0 both Bob and Eve have same clusters. When Eve
is located further away from Bob such that dBE = 1.3λ, two new clusters are born, and the
old clusters are displaced in terms of location as well as power.
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Figure 5.2: Power image showing evolution of clusters following truncated Laplacian distribution over time and space. a) Clusters at Bob and Eve when dBE = 0 b) Clusters at Eve
when dBE = 1.3λ.

Figure 5.3(a) plots the cluster center arrival angle at Eve as a function of the BobEve separation dBE for LB = 4 clusters at Bob. As can be seen, as Eve moves from Bob,
one cluster dies and two new ones are born. Figure 5.3(b) shows an expanded plot of the
arrival angle for one of the clusters to allow better visualization of the extent of cluster angle
variation. Similar curves exist describing the cluster arrival angles and gains. The remaining
computations use LB = 4. The exploration of other values of LB have shown that while LB
impacts IK , it weakly influences the ratio of ISK to IK , which is the focus of this study.
5.3.2

Model Validation
Before applying the proposed model to detailed analysis of the key rates, it is impor-

tant to verify that it provides results that match experimental observations. Fortunately,
recent measurements comparing IK and ISK for a limited set of scenarios appears in [17]. To
mimic the experimental arrangement of [17], Alice uses a uniform circular array of NA = 8
elements with an inter-element spacing of 0.47λ (circle diameter of 1.2λ), while Bob and
Eve each have square arrays (NB = NE = 4) with side lengths of 0.43λ. When showing

78

5 1.9
4

(a)

(b)

1.8
1.7
0

0.5

1

φR

3
2
1
LB=4
0

0.3

0.6

0.9

1.2

1.5

1.8

2.1

2.4

dBE /λ
Figure 5.3: (a) Variation in the cluster central arrival angle (φR , radians) as a function of
Eve’s displacement from Bob computed from the AR multipath model with LB = 4 clusters at
Bob. (b) Expanded version of the arrival angle variation for one of the clusters.

the results for NA = 4 or 2, we respectively use a subset forming the square array of filled
triangle symbols or the linear array of unfilled triangle symbols shown in Fig. 5.1. Similarly,
when showing results for NB = NE = 3 or 2, we respectively use the arrays marked by the
three triangle symbols or the two unfilled triangle symbols shown in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.4 plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of IK and ISK for different
array sizes assuming a cluster AS of 26◦ and K = 0 dB. CDFs are obtained by fixing the
distance between Bob and Eve to be 10 cm (0.85λ) or 2 m (17λ) and then generating 2000
random realizations of the PAS at Bob and correspondingly at Eve to compute IK and ISK .
As expected the results reveal that for a large separation between Bob and Eve, IK and ISK
are similar. It is important to note that while the difference between IK and ISK increases
with larger arrays, the fractional difference remains similar at approximately 15 − 20% for
dBE = 10 cm and around 5 − 9% for dBE = 2 m.
A comparison of these results with those presented in Figure 14 of [17] reveals that the
general observations from the two are the same, with the exception of two major differences.
First, the variance of the measured results is larger than that of the simulations, likely due
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Figure 5.4: CDFs for IK and ISK when K = 0 dB. The designations (Nξ ,NA ) indicate that
Bob and Eve have Nξ antennas each for ξ ∈ [B, E] and Alice has NA antennas.

to the fact that measurements are averages of observations at several different locations with
significantly different propagation conditions. Despite this difference, the average simulated
and measured values match very closely. Second, for the case when NA = 8, NB = NE = 4
and dBE = 2 m, the measured difference between IK and ISK is larger than the difference
predicted by the simulations. This may be due to a higher value of K for the measured
channels. Despite these differences, this comparison demonstrates that the simulation model
provides realistic trends and accurate average key rate values.
5.3.3

Role of K-Factor
In the following, the ratio IVK /IK is explored, which represents the fraction of the

available key bits that are vulnerable to determination by Eve due to non-zero correlation

E h(B) h(E)† . The antenna configuration from Figure 5.4 with NA = 4 and NB = NE = 3
is chosen as a representative case. Figure 5.5 plots this fraction of vulnerable key bits as a
function of the Bob-Eve separation for different values of the K-factor when AS = 26◦ . The
solid and dashed lines show the results when the AR model is used to generate the multipath
clusters and when Eve’s PAS is assumed identical to Bob’s, respectively. As expected, in a
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Figure 5.5: Relative number of vulnerable key bits as a function of Eve’s distance from Bob
(dBE ) and different values of K when NA = 4, NB = NE = 3, and AS = 26◦ . Dashed lines
designate results for a simple propagation model in which Bob and Eve have an identical PAS.

non-LOS (NLOS) propagation environment (K = −20 dB), the difference between IK and
ISK decreases with an increase in dBE , with the fraction of vulnerable key bits approaching
zero as dBE increases. However, as K increases the dominant LOS path creates considerable
correlation between h(B) and h(E) , leading to a larger difference between IK and ISK .
The results for the model in which the multipaths are assumed identical at Bob and
Eve show that while this simple model gives similar trends, allowing the clusters to evolve
using the experimentally-validated AR model creates a more rapid decline in the fraction of
vulnerable key bits with Bob-Eve separation. However, as dBE increases, the decorrelation
created by the multipath propagation causes the curves for the two models to converge.
Regardless of the model used, simulation results show that the simpler expression for IK is
within 5% of the more complicated computation for ISK for dBE > 2.5λ and K < −10 dB.
5.3.4

Role of Angular Spread
Next the impact of cluster angular spread on key rate behavior is considered. Fig-

ure 5.6 plots the ratio IVK /IK as a function of the Bob-Eve separation for two different
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Figure 5.6: Relative number of vulnerable key bits as a function of Eve’s distance from Bob
(dBE ) for NA = 4, NB = NE = 3, and K = −20 dB and two AS values. Dashed lines designate
results for a simple propagation model in which Bob and Eve have an identical PAS.

values of AS (26◦ and 10◦ ) when K = −20 dB, NA = 4, and NB = NE = 3. The results
demonstrate that a reduction in AS increases the vulnerable key bits, as reduced AS causes
the channel to be more directional which in turn leads to higher correlation between h(B) and
h(E) . However, for small AS, the angular deviation of the cluster central angles by the AR
model is a larger fraction of the cluster width, and the change in the overall PAS created by
cluster birth/death processes is significant. Therefore, the performance difference between
the results obtained with the AR model and those given by the simpler model (in which Bob
and Eve have an identical PAS) is more significant for smaller AS values, with the fraction
of vulnerable bits predicted by the simple model being approximately twice that predicted
by the more sophisticated spatially-variant AR model. The results generally show that for
smaller values of AS dBE must be a large value before we can use IK in place of ISK .
5.3.5

Role of Number of Antennas
Finally, the impact of the number of antennas at different nodes on the key rate be-

havior is explored. Figure 5.7 plots the ratio IVK /IK as a function of the Bob-Eve separation
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Figure 5.7: Relative number of vulnerable key bits as a function of Eve’s distance from Bob
(dBE ) when AS = 26◦ for different array sizes when K = 0 dB.

for different combinations of NA , NB , and NE when AS = 26◦ and K = 0 dB. Figure 5.8
presents similar results when K = −20 dB. These results demonstrate that the fraction
of key bits that are vulnerable to Eve declines more rapidly with dBE for smaller arrays,
meaning that for small node separation Eve is able to obtain more information about h(B)
as her array size increases. The results further show that Eve enjoys an advantage when
she is close to Bob if she possesses more antennas than Alice and Bob. This is mainly due
to improved SNR due to increased multi-antenna gain, as the channels to the additional
antennas do not offer improved correlation between h(B) and h(E) . Regardless of array size,
the results confirm that dBE must be greater than about 1λ before one can begin to ignore
the difference between IK and ISK in an analysis.
5.3.6

Role of Antenna Coupling
While the impact of antenna mutual coupling is ignored for this analysis, for small

values of dBE , cross-array mutual coupling can impact the results. Therefore the model
presented in Figure 3.1 is used to explore the impact on the key rate of coupling both
within each array and across both arrays. Figure 5.9 repeats the computation shown in
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Figure 5.8: Relative number of vulnerable key bits as a function of Eve’s distance from Bob
(dBE ) when AS = 26◦ for different array sizes when K = −20 dB.

Figure 5.5 using the full propagation model, where the solid curves show the result when
Bob and Eve are equipped with an impedance matching network that optimally transfers
power from the antennas to the loads while the dashed curves show the result when mutual
coupling is ignored. The value of IK for both cases assumes no cross-array coupling, since
IK is the key rate when the eavesdropper is not present. The results generally indicate
that mutual coupling has only a small impact on the fraction of available key bits that are
vulnerable and virtually no impact on the conclusions one may draw from the computations
shown here. However, as shown in [56], coupling does have a significant impact on the
underlying quantities IK and ISK and is therefore important to include in general studies on
key establishment.
5.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter formulates a straightforward yet realistic model for computing the secure

key rate for two legitimate nodes who establish their secret key using observations of the
reciprocal electromagnetic propagation channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
By applying the model to compute the available and secure key rates for a variety of different
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Figure 5.9: Relative number of vulnerable key bits as a function of Eve’s distance from Bob
(dBE ) and different values of K when NA = 4, NB = NE = 3, and AS = 26◦ when mutual
coupling is included. Dashed lines designate results when mutual coupling is neglected.

multipath parameters, it is demonstrated that the secure key rate is approximately equal
to the available key rate when the separation between the nodes is adequately large (more
than 2.5 wavelengths) and the propagation K-factor is smaller than 0 dB. This suggests
that in analyses that ignore the impact of the eavesdropper and focus on the available
key rate, the results are approximately representative of the secure key rate under these
propagation conditions. The analysis also contrasts performance differences when assuming
the multipath parameters change as a function of the distance between the eavesdropper and
the legitimate node to those obtained when it is assumed that both nodes observe the same
multipath. While the results demonstrate that both models provide the same trends, using
the simple model over predicts the fraction of bits that are vulnerable to an eavesdropper
by as much as a factor of two.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of practical issues related to physical layer key generation. Specifically, this work focuses on the impact of array mutual
coupling in a MIMO communication environment, channel fading statistics between the
communicating nodes, and practical limitations such as non-reciprocity that arises from the
RF circuits used in the radios.
6.1

Summary
An overview of different cryptography techniques and their comparison with key gen-

eration using reciprocal propagation channel is presented in Chapter 2. Next, the performance metrics for physical layer security, namely the available key rate which refers to the
number of bits that can be generated per observation of propagation channel between two
radios and the secure key rate which quantifies the number of key bits which are secure
from a passive eavesdropper are presented. Furthermore, the impact of array size, multipath
richness, and spacing between the communicating nodes and an eavesdropper on key rate
metrics is analyzed for a path based model which assumes ideal isotropic antennas and no
array mutual coupling.
The impact of array mutual coupling on key rate metrics is analyzed in Chapter 3.
This is accomplished by developing a realistic network model of a MIMO communication
system between two communicating nodes and an eavesdropper that can be very near to
one of the nodes. This model incorporates the impact of matching networks, array coupling,
and noise that depends on LNA parameters and uses a cluster based propagation model.
Results demonstrate that high mutual coupling can have a significant impact on key rate
metrics, which can be overcome by the use of proper matching network, where optimal
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matching network is found to offer key rates that are 10-15% higher than those offered by
a suboptimal diagonal matching network. Furthermore, if an eavesdropper is located near
(< 0.5λ) one of the legitimate nodes, then the secure key rate reduces significantly.
Chapter 4 focuses on the fact that due to non-reciprocity of transmit and receive
RF circuits inside the radio, the end-to-end propagation channel between two nodes may
not be reciprocal. The network model developed in Chapter 3 is modified to incorporate
the non-reciprocal contributions. The simulations show that non-reciprocity can effectively
reduce both the available as well as the secure key rate. Next, the use of a calibration
technique based on total least square (TLS) algorithm is explored. Results demonstrate
that the software based calibration technique can effectively make the propagation channel
reciprocal. However the time required for calibration increases with an increase in array size
or degradation in SNR.
A cluster based propagation model which can be used to quantify the difference between available and secure key rate in the presence of a nearby eavesdropper under different
propagation conditions is proposed in Chapter 5. This model is validated based on measurements acquired in recent experiments [17]. Using this model, the impact of the number
of clusters, cluster angular spread, K-factor, and array size on key rate metrics is studied.
Analysis reveals that the secure key rate is approximately equivalent to the available key rate
when the environment is multipath rich (K-factor less than 0 dB) and the spacing between
the legitimate node and the eavesdropper is large (> 2.5λ). Results also demonstrate that
if multipath characteristics are assumed to be same at an eavesdropper and a nearby legitimate node, then the computed secure key rate can be significantly lower, which highlights
the importance of proper modeling of the propagation channel.
6.2

Future Work
There are several possible directions for future research related to the topics presented

in this dissertation. A few of the ideas are presented below:
1. This work has assumed a single eavesdropper located near one of the communicating
nodes. In practice there can be multiple eavesdropper nodes in the environment which
can collaborate with each other to reduce the secure key rate. The work presented in
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this dissertation on array mutual coupling and propagation channel conditions can be
extended to model multiple eavesdroppers to analyze their impact on the secure key
rate.
2. Only a passive eavesdropper is considered in this work. The presence of an active
eavesdropper poses many challenges, as its physical location may be away from the
communicating nodes, but it can transmit false information to both legitimate nodes.
This is especially important for calibration, as Bob must send his channel estimate to
Alice. This problem can be avoided by using an authentication mechanism in addition
to physical layer security which ensures that key bits are generated based only on the
communication between legitimate nodes.
3. The non-reciprocity in the propagation channel is modeled in Chapter 4 using phase
errors in the matching network. However, in practical systems gain errors can also
occur in matching networks, but they are relatively hard to model. The present work
can be extended to study in detail the effect of gain error in the matching networks.
4. The calibration study presented in Chapter 4 is based on simulations. The current work
can be extended by an experimental campaign in which the impact of non-reciprocity in
the propagation channel on the key rate metrics can be quantified. Also, the proposed
calibration technique based on the TLS algorithm can be applied in real time to explore
the overall effectiveness of the algorithm.
5. Finally, the experimental campaign mentioned above can also be used to quantize the
impact of array mutual coupling. This can be accomplished by varying the interelement spacing between the array elements and placing the eavesdropper at different
distance offsets from one of the communicating nodes. This would provide a very useful
comparison to the results presented in Chapter 3.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1

Lossless and Reciprocal Matching Network Design
Lossless reciprocal matching networks are characterized by unitary S-matrices such

that S† S = I and S = ST , where {·}† and {·}T are conjugate transpose and transpose,
respectively. This appendix demonstrates the design of a lossless matching network and
then shows how to further simplify the expressions to ensure reciprocity.
†
To design a lossless matching network, the SVD of sub-blocks Sij = Uij Λij Vij
(see
1/2

(3.1)) are substituted into the lossless constraint to obtain
Vij Θij = Vjj

Λij = I − Λjj

i 6= j,

(A.1)

where Θij is a diagonal matrix with unit-magnitude entries. This operation also leads to
Λ11 U†11 U12 (I − Λ22 )1/2 Θ12 = −Θ†21 (I − Λ11 )1/2 U†21 U22 Λ22 .
1/2

1/2

(A.2)

The sub-blocks of the matrix S that ensure the matching network is lossless can then be
expressed as
†
S11 = U11 Λ11 V11
,
1/2

†
S12 = U12 Θ12 (I − Λ22 )1/2 V22
,
†
,
S21 = U21 Θ21 (I − Λ11 )1/2 V11
†
S22 = U22 Λ22 V22
.
1/2
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(A.3)

If the network is reciprocal, we must have S = ST which mean
∗
S11 = ST
11 ⇒ V11 = U11 ,
∗
S22 = ST
22 ⇒ V22 = U22 ,
T
1/2 T
U22 = U11 (I − Λ11 )1/2 ΘT
S12 = ST
21 U21 ,
21 ⇒ U12 Θ12 (I − Λ22 )
T
∗
⇒ U12 (I − Λ22 )1/2 Θ12 = U11 (I − Λ11 )1/2 ΘT
21 U21 U22 .

(A.4)

Inserting (A.4) into (A.2) leads to
1/2

1/2

Λ11 = −Uc Λ22 UT
c
T
∗
Uc = ΘT
21 U21 U22 .

(A.5)

Assuming Uc = −jUo leads to
1/2

1/2

Λ11 = Uo Λ22 UT
o,

(A.6)
1/2

1/2

which suggests that Uo Λ22 UT
o is the SVD of the real diagonal matrix Λ11 . There exists a
complete family of matching networks that satisfies these conditions. Since we are interested
in only one lossless reciprocal matching network that achieves the design goal, we can further
specify the singular vectors and values. Choosing Uo = I and Λ22 = Λ11 leads to
T
∗
ΘT
21 U21 U22 = −jI ⇒ U21 Θ21 = jU22 .

(A.7)

Inserting (A.7) into (A.4) leads to
∗
U12 (I − Λ11 )1/2 Θ12 = jU11 (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
22 U22 ⇒ U12 Θ12 = jU11 .
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(A.8)

Using the above expression in (A.3), the sub-blocks of S that ensure the design is both
lossless and reciprocal can then be expressed as
1/2

S11 = U11 Λ11 UT
11
S12 = jU11 (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
22
S21 = jU22 (I − Λ11 )1/2 UT
11
1/2

S22 = U22 Λ22 UT
22 .
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(A.9)
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